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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
ERYK DREJ, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20080003-SC 
15KII I OF APPELLANT 
J URISDICTION
 Q F T H E UTAH SI JPR EME COUR T 
I his Coi ii t has appellate jurisdiction in this mattei pursuant to the provisions of 
Utah Code Annotated § 7X A - 3 -102(3)(i). 
1>^ KS PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Whether I lah c'ode \i mutated § 76-5-205.5, wl lich requires that Drej bear the 
bi u dei i of pi o v it ig by a pi epoi iderance of e v idei ice that I le is entitled to special mitigation 
is unconstitutional. There is a presumption of validity when assessing the 
constitutionality of legislation., and UK- "ourt resolves any reasonable doubts \ d\o\ of 
loiisfitiilioiiulih Skitter iloiih\ 2002 W\ I HIN.'Wr \\\ W (cKadon-, oniifled). 
However, when a statute infringes on fundamental riglits or creates suspect classifications 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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then heightened judicial scrutiny is applied and the matter should be reviewed for 
correctness. Merrill v. Labor Com 'n, 2007 UT App 214, ^ 10, 163 P.3d 741. See also, 
Juddv. Drezga, 2004 UT 91, ffl[ 9, 42, 103 P.3d 135, and Wood v. University Medical 
Center, 2002 UT 134, fflf 37-46, 67 P.3d 436 (most article I rights have generated some 
form of heightened judicial scrutiny). This issue was preserved in written memoranda 
(R. 325-18,374-348). 
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
All controlling statutory provisions are set forth in full in the Addenda. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Eryk Drej appeals from the interlocutory order of the Honorable Lynn W. Davis, 
Fourth District Court, after he was granted permission to appeal by the Utah Supreme 
Court. Specifically, he appeals the order denying his Specific Request for Instruction 
Regarding Burden of Proof and his request that Utah Code Annotated § 76-5-205.5 be 
declared unconstitutional because it requires defendants to prove special mitigation. 
B. Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition 
Eryk Drej was charged by information filed in Fourth District Court on June 16, 
2 
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2005 with Murder, a first degree felon\ !•• \ inlation of Ftah Code \nncL\icd ? "6-5-203 
(R 2 1). On In ine 24, 2005 a competenc) petitioi I "\ v as filed and subseqi ientl> oi dered by 
the trial court (R. 22-20, 27-24, 30). After evaluation by two court-appointed examiners, 
Drej was found incompetent to proceed and he was committed to the custody of the 
Depai tment of I In n i lai I Serv ices on A ugi ist 16 21305 w itl i a i ecomn lendation tl lat lie I: 2 
securely confined (R. 35, 40-37). On March 21, 2006 the trial court determined that Drej 
had been restored to competency but was to remain at the State Hospital (R. 55) 
\ prelin linai > 1 leai ii ig \\< as held 01 ) In 11 le 20, 2006 and Di ej w as boi ind civ "r for 
trial on the charge upon a findim.* of probable cause by the tnal c<^ r ' R "v-" k 420). 
Op '-'K IS. 2006 Or. • :-. U a Noiuvoi Intent to \^c\\ Menu: 11 - e^ Defense 
insanity and evidence of his diminished mental capacity .it the time of the alleged 
offense, as well ?s evidence HI mitigatu^, ,,\ ±\,i\)uui\ 1 omicide, uruK : < ;>-N » : * 
evaluation through the I)ep:irtincnt of Human Services (R. 83-82). 
On April 30, 200 / Di ej filed a Specific Request foi Instruction Regarding 
Burden of Proof and Supporting Memorandum, seeking the trial court's instruction to the 
jury that Drej is entitled to a finding that special mitigation exists unless the prosecution 
pi oves, beyoi id a 1 easonable doi ibt tl lat special n litigation does m tf exist (R. 2 7 / 270, 
325-318). On June 15, 2007 Drej filed an amended memorandum that corrected some 
3 
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erroneous citations contained in the original memorandum (R. 325-318). After oral 
argument (R. 422) and the submission of supplemental memoranda (R. 347-338, 374-
348, 374-73) the trial court denied Drej's request for an instruction that the State bears 
the burden of disproving special mitigation (R. 386-76). 
On Jan 2, 2008 Drej filed a Petition for Permission to Appeal Interlocutory Order 
with the Utah Supreme Court. The matter was transferred to the Utah Court of Appeals, 
and on February 13, 2008 that court granted permission for an interlocutory appeal. This 
matter was then transferred back to Utah Supreme Court. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
Robert Deters, a staff forensic pathologist in the Utah medical examiner's office 
testified that on the evening of June 1, 2005 he performed an autopsy on Lukasz Drej, a 
25 year-old male, who was the victim of multiple (22) gunshot wounds (R. 422: 6-7, 9). 
The cause of death was that Lucasz bled to death as a result of the gunshot wounds, ten of 
which could have been fatal (R. 422: 8, 10). Lucasz also had a couple of lacerations of 
his scalp, which appeared to be from a blunt object (R. 422: 8). Deters also indicated in 
his report that Lucasz was "shot by a family member at their residence" (R. 422: 9). 
On June 1, 2005 Officer Ivan Bird of the American Fork Police Department 
responded to 29 South 400 East on possible shots fired (R. 422: 11, 12). Upon arriving at 
the residence, he observed Drej walking westbound in the driveway towards the gate (R. 
422: 13-14). He was carrying a shotgun, slung around his shoulder (R. 422: 14). Drej 
4 
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informed Bird that he also had a pistol in the back of his waistband (R. 422: 15). 
Bird and another officer, Sergeant Greg Ludlow, drew their weapons and 
commanded Drej to get on the ground (R. 422: 17). Drej refused but was eventually 
tackled and brought down by a third officer, Tony Weinmueller (R. 422: 17-18). A nine 
millimeter Baretta handgun was located in Drej's back waistband (R. 422: 19). The guns 
were secured and unloaded (R. 422: 20-21). Drej also was found in possession of two 
knives (R. 422: 20). Upon questioning, Drej informed Bird that he had a brother named 
Lukasz and that the last time he'd seen him was "around the house and in the back" (R. 
422: 20-21). Weinmuller testified that Drej was very agitated (R. 422: 38). 
After Drej was secured, Officer Tony Weinmuller continued to investigate (R. 
422: 31). Before Weinmuller entered the house, he noticed scuff marks and a red fluid 
leading away from the truck towards the home (R. 422: 32). Weinmuller and Ludlow 
went around the east side of the house and entered through the back door (R. 422: 31). 
They made contact with a female in the upstairs northwest bedroom who indicated that 
there was another son possibly in the house, armed (R. 422: 31). Nobody else was 
located in the home (R. 422: 34). 
Weinmuller went back outside to further examine the scuff marks (R. 422: 34). At 
the bottom of a stairwell he saw a male individual laying on his stomach with his hands 
extended out towards his head (R. 422: 34-35). The male was gray in color, cold to the 
touch, and had no pulse (R. 422: 35). He was identified as Lukasz Drej (R. 422: 36). 
5 
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On June 3, 2005 Drej was interviewed at the Utah County Sheriffs Office by 
Officer Keith Southard (R. 422: 41). Southard testified that Drej indicated that "he 
started shooting his brother with the intent of trying to hit all the major organs" while his 
brother was partially inside the vehicle talking on the phone (R. 422: 43, 44). Drej also 
struck his brother in the head twice after pulling him to the ground before dragging his 
body down the stairwell (R. 422: 44-45). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Drej asserts that the special mitigation provision set forth in Utah Code Annotated 
§ 76-5-205.5 creates an affirmative defense. However, subsection (5)(a) of that statute 
denies him due process of law, guaranteed by the Utah Constitution and the United States 
Constitution, by removing from the State the responsibility of disproving the defense and 
placing the burden of persuasion on the defendant. In addition, this requirement is in 
direct conflict with Utah Code Annotated § 76-1-502, which requires that the State 
disprove all defenses and affirmative defenses beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Drej asserts that if special mitigation is not found to be an affirmative defense, in 
his case, § 76-6-205.5 creates alternative method of proving the crime of manslaughter 
found in § 76-5-205. Defendant claims that special mitigation is merely the third of three 
sets of essential elements of manslaughter. Because the State is required to prove every 
essential element of a crime the burden of proof function in subsection (5)(a) violates the 
Due Process Clause of both the Utah Constitution and the United States Constitution by 
6 
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impermissibly shifting the State's burden of proving essential elements to the defense. 
Drej asserts that the burden of proof function of § 76-5-205.5(5)(a) is a rule of 
procedure and was either unconstitutionally adopted or unconstitutionally amended by 
the Utah Legislature. If the act of the Legislature is seen as adopting a new rule it 
violates the separation of powers requirements of Article V, § 1 of the Utah Constitution. 
If the act of the Legislature is seen as an amendment to an existing rule of procedure then 
it is unconstitutional because it was not enacted by a vote of at least two-thirds of all 
members of both houses of the Legislature, as required by the Utah Constitution, Article 
VIII, § 4. In either case, the burden of proof provision of Utah Code Annotated § 76-5-
205(5)(a) is unconstitutional by violating separation of powers. 
Finally § 76-5-205.5(5)(a) denies Drej equal protection of law under the United 
States Constitution, and under the uniform operation of laws provision in Article I 
Section 24 of the Utah Constitution. Without a rational basis or a legitimate state 
interest, this provision requires Drej to navigate different and more onerous procedures in 
the presentation of his defense from similarly situated non-mentally ill individuals. 
Alternatively, mental illness constitutes a suspect class or quasi-suspect class requiring 
even more heightened scrutiny. 
Although the Court should find special mitigation unconstitutional, the 
unconstitutional language, burden-shifting language, of Utah Code Annotated § 76-5-
205.5 can be excised leaving the remainder intact thus preserving the intent of the 
7 
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Legislature that there be reduced culpability for persons committing homicides while 
acting under a delusion attributable to mental illness. 
ARGUMENT 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED § 76-5-205.5 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE IT 
VIOLATES DREJ'S RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION, WAS 
IMPROPERLY ENACTED AND VIOLATES THE REQUIREMENT OF SEPARATION 
OF POWERS 
Drej was charged with murder for the death of his brother, Lucasz. After being 
found incompetent to stand trial for seven months (R. 40-37, 55), he filed notice of his 
intent to assert his entitlement to special mitigation under Utah Code Annotated § 76-5-
205.5 (R. 81). Subsection (1) establishes that special mitigation exists when: "(a) the 
actor causes the death of another under circumstances that are not legally justified, but 
the actor acts under a delusion attributable to a mental illness as defined in Section 76-2-
305; and (b) the nature of the delusion is such that, if the facts existed as the defendant 
believed them to be in his delusional state, those facts would provide a legal justification 
for his conduct." 
Subsection (5)(a) of Utah Code Annotated § 76-5-205.5 provides: "If the trier of 
fact finds the elements of [murder]... are proven beyond a reasonable doubt, and also that 
the existence of special mitigation under this section is established by a preponderance of 
the evidence, it shall return a verdict on [manslaughter]." Subsection (5)(a) does not 
specify, however, which party has the responsibility to carry the burden of establishing 
special mitigation facts by a preponderance of the evidence. Accordingly, Drej requested 
8 
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that the trial court refuse the State's request that the jury be instructed that Defendant 
bears the burden of proving special mitigation facts and that the jury be instructed that it 
is required to find that special mitigation has been established unless it finds that the State 
has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that special mitigation is not justified (R. 325-18, 
374-48). Drej asserted that absent such an interpretation, subsection (5)(a) is 
unconstitutional under both the United States and Utah constitutions. 
1. THE BURDEN OF PROOF PROVISION OF UTAH CODE ANNOTATED § 76-
6-205.5(5)(A) VIOLATES DREJ'S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW BY 
IMPERMISSIBLY PLACING THE BURDEN OF PROVING SPECIAL 
MITIGATION ON HIM RATHER THAN THE STATE. 
A. The State is required to prove each element of the offense charged and 
disprove any affirmative defense raised by a defendant beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
The due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
Constitution of the United States require proof of each element of a charged offense 
beyond a reasonable doubt in criminal trials. "Lest there remain any doubt about the 
constitutional stature of the reasonable-doubt standard, we explicitly hold that the Due 
Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is 
charged." In Re Winship, 397 US 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1073, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970). 
In Mullaney v. Wilbur, All U.S. 684,701, 95 S.Ct. 1881, 1890, 44 L.Ed2d 508 (1975) the 
United States Supreme Court clarified that the Winship holding also requires the 
prosecution to prove the non-availability of defenses raised by the accused which would 
9 
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serve to negate an element of the offense. 
The Due Process Clause of Article I § 7 of the Utah Constitution also requires that 
the State bears the burden of proving each essential element of a crime. When a statute 
shifts the burden of proof to a defendant in a criminal case it violates the Utah 
Constitution. State v. Tebbs, 786 P.2d 775, 777 (Ut.App. 1990). The use of a 
presumption or assumption that shifts the burden of proof on any substantive element of a 
crime to the defendant violates the Due Process Clause of Article I § 7 of the Utah 
Constitution. Statev. Sorenson, 758 P.2d 466, 470 (Ut.App. 1988). 
Further, the Utah Supreme Court has consistently held that Utah due process 
considerations require that the State must always disprove an affirmative defense raised 
by a defendant. "In State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71,82 n.7 (Utah 1982), we observed that a 
long line of Utah cases imposes on the prosecution the burden to disprove the existence 
of affirmative defenses beyond a reasonable doubt, once the defendant has produced 
some evidence of the defense." State v. Swenson, 838 P.2d 1136, 38 (Utah 1992). "A 
necessary element of a murder conviction is the absence of affirmative defenses. It is 
fundamental that the State carries the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt each 
element of an offense, including the absence of an affirmative defense once the defense is 
put in issue." State v. Low, 2008 UT 58,1f45, 192 P.3d 867 citing State v. Hill, 727 P.2d 
221, 222 (Utah 1986), (internal quotations omitted). Thus, as a matter of right guaranteed 
by the Due Process Clause of the Utah Constitution, the State bears the burden of proving 
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all elements of a crime, including each element of any affirmative defense in issue, must 
remain on the State. Furthermore, shifting the burden of proof to the accused violates 
both the United States and Utah Constitutions. State v. Swenson, 838 P.2d at 1138-39 
(Utah 1992) (defendant presented an exception to the statute as a defense, Court ruled 
that "once the defendant properly injects the issue, the state is obliged to establish the 
contrary beyond a reasonable doubt"). See also State v. Torres, 619 P.2d 694, 695 (Utah 
1980) (defendant raised evidence of self-defense, Court ruled that the State must prove 
every element of a crime, including the absence of any affirmative defenses in the 
evidence). 
The distinction between the burden of going forward and the burden of persuasion 
is codified in Utah law. Utah Code Annotated § 76-1-501(1) reads: "A defendant in a 
criminal proceeding is presumed to be innocent until each element of the offense charged 
against him is proved beyond a reasonable doubt. In absence of such proof, the defendant 
shall be acquitted" (emphasis added). And § 76-1-502(2) requires that a defense must be 
disproved by the State, beyond a reasonable doubt, if: "(a) The defense is in issue in the 
case as a result of evidence presented at trial, either by the prosecution or the defense; or 
(b) The defense is an affirmative defense, and the defendant has presented evidence of 
such affirmative defense." 
Thus, federal and Utah cases interpreting federal and state due process require that 
the State bears the burden of proving all essential elements of a crime. Utah cases and 
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Utah statutory law go further and require that when evidence of an affirmative defense is 
presented, the jury must be instructed that the State must disprove the affirmative defense 
beyond a reasonable doubt. In Utah, in either of these instances, the burden of persuasion 
cannot be shifted to the defendant. Drej asserts that this standard must be applied in his 
case and this Court must examine special mitigation in light of this precedent. 
B. Special mitigation of § 76-5-205.5 should either be considered an 
affirmative defense or as an alternative means of establishing manslaughter. 
i) Special mitigation is an affirmative defense. 
Black's defines an affirmative defense as "[a] defendant's assertion of facts and 
arguments that, if true, will defeat the plaintiffs or prosecutor's claim, even if all the 
allegations in the complaint are true." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 451 (8th ed. 2004) 
(definition also provides that a defendant bears the burden of proving an affirmative 
defense but this does not apply in Utah). Affirmative defenses act to intervene between a 
defendant's conduct, which would otherwise constitute an offense, and the guilty verdict 
because the defense in some way justifies the otherwise criminal conduct. 
Utah law recognizes several affirmative defenses as justifications to criminal 
responsibility where, as represented in Black's definition, the affirmative defense justifies 
the conduct without denying that it occurred. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-401- 407 (the 
justifications of force in defense of a person, force in arrest, peace officer's use of deadly 
force, force in defense of habitation, force in defense of property, and deadly force in 
defense of persons or real property all constitute defenses to prosecution). If either party 
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introduces evidence of one or more of these justifications, the State is required to 
disprove the justification beyond a reasonable doubt. See UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-1-
501(1), 76-1-502. 
In addition, Utah law designates several other affirmative defenses to criminal 
responsibility. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-301-308 (the defenses of capacity, 
compulsion, entrapment, ignorance or mistake of fact or law, mental illness (mens rea 
model), voluntary intoxication, and voluntary termination of efforts prior to offense 
constitute statutory affirmative defenses). These affirmative defenses are complete 
defenses if the defendant or prosecution introduces evidence of the defense and the State 
fails to disprove it beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant must be acquitted. UTAH 
CODE ANN. §§76-1-501,502. 
A statutory affirmative defense is also specifically set forth within the murder 
statute for extreme emotional distress or a mistaken legal justification known as imperfect 
self-defense. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-203(4)(a). This affirmative defense constitutes a 
partial defense. If the defendant or prosecution introduce evidence of the defense and the 
State fails to disprove it beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant's potential verdict is 
reduced from murder to manslaughter. As noted above, the State is required to disprove 
these affirmative defenses beyond a reasonable doubt any time a defendant puts the 
defense into issue. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-l-502(2)(b). 
Special mitigation under § 76-5-205.5 provides that "Special mitigation exists 
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when the actor causes the death of another or attempts to cause the death of another under 
circumstances that are not legally justified, but the actor acts under a delusion attributable 
to a mental illness... the nature of the delusion is such that, if the facts existed as the 
defendant believed them to be in the delusional state, those facts would provide a legal 
justification for the defendant's conduct and the defendant's actions, in light of the 
delusion, were reasonable from the objective viewpoint of a reasonable person." UTAH 
CODE ANN. §76-5-205.5. 
The Black's definition for affirmative defense, and Utah's statutory affirmative 
defenses, exactly resemble the function of special mitigation. If the elements of the 
underlying offense — the "allegations in the complaint" - are proved the existence of 
special mitigation will "defeat" the verdict on the underlying offense and provide a 
partial defense similar to imperfect self-defense. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 451 (8th 
ed. 2004), UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-205.5. Notwithstanding the Legislature's 
designation of § 76-5-205.5 as 'mitigation', the provisions of the statute, in practice, 
provide for an affirmative defense. As with the other aforementioned statutory 
justifications and affirmative defenses, special mitigation allows the trier of fact to 
determine whether special circumstances justify reduced culpability. The defendant is 
essentially acquitted of the charged offense and convicted of a wholly different and lesser 
offense. In this case if special mitigation were found to apply the factfinder would 
"return a verdict on the reduced charge." UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-205.5(5). Drej would 
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be acquitted of murder and instead be found guilty of manslaughter. 
At the same time the jury deliberates on the State's burden as to the elements of 
the underlying crime the jury must also consider whether the elements of special 
mitigation have been met and return a special verdict on special mitigation. UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 76-5-205.5(7). Just as with the general verdict a finding of special mitigation 
must be unanimous. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-205.5(5)(a). If the jury fails to 
unanimously find that either special mitigation applies or does not apply the jury is hung 
despite the general verdict on the original charge. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-205.5(6)(d). 
In other words, the failure to prove or disprove special mitigation undermines the validity 
of the general verdict. That undermining stands in stark opposition to the State's position 
that special mitigation merely a mitigates the level of punishment and is unrelated to 
guilt. The existence of special mitigation is so important that despite a jury's finding of 
guilt on the underlying crime the verdict is incomplete without a unanimous finding on 
special mitigation. Drej asserts that this is more than mere mitigation. 
Traditional mitigation generally directs a sentencing court to reduce a sentence or 
punishment because, although a defendant has been found guilty of the convicted offense, 
the mitigating factors make the scheduled punishment inappropriate. For example in 
considering sentencing on a capital felony, after a defendant has pled guilty or been 
found guilty, at sentencing evidence of aggravating and mitigation facts are presented to 
either the court or the jury. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-207. If the jury is not 
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persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that the total aggravation outweighs the total 
mitigation then the death penalty cannot be imposed. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-207(5). 
However, the underlying capital offense is not challenged or undermined in any way. In 
this case mitigation has no effect on the verdict, only the punishment. This is an 
important distinction between mitigation generally, as seen in a capital sentencing, and 
special mitigation under § 76-5-205.5. Special mitigation is a matter of guilt and it stands 
between a defendant and a guilty verdict and traditional mitigation is only concerned with 
punishment. In spite of the Legislature's poor name choice special mitigation behaves 
like an affirmative defense, not like mitigation. For all intents and purposes special 
mitigation in § 76-5-205.5 created an affirmative defense and it should be treated as an 
affirmative defense. 
A comparison of the affirmative defense provisions of § 76-5-203(4) (imperfect 
self-defense) with the special mitigation provisions of § 76-5-205.5 demonstrates the 
degree to which special mitigation behaves like a defense. Both statutes seek to intervene 
between a homicide defendant and the charge of murder due to a mistaken belief relating 
to a legal justification. Both statutes ask whether the defendant's actions were reasonable 
in light of the mistake. Both statutes function as limited or incomplete defenses and 
reduce the offense one level, from murder to manslaughter etc. Both statutes effect 
verdict and judgment rather than merely the punishment. Finally, both statutes are 
primarily concerned with limiting the culpability with those who kill under circumstances 
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that demonstrate reduced culpability. In § 76-5-203(4), imperfect self-defense, the 
defendant must present evidence that he acted "under a reasonable belief that the 
circumstances provided a legal justification or excuse for his conduct although the 
conduct was not legally justifiable or excusable under the existing circumstances." UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 76-5-203(4). In § 76-5-205.5 the defendant must introduce evidence that 
he acted "under a delusion... such that, if the facts existed as the defendant believed them 
to be in his delusional state, those facts would provide a legal justification for his 
conduct" if his actions were reasonable given the delusion. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-
205.5(1). The similarity between the two is undeniable. 
Special mitigation works just like an affirmative defense. Special mitigation, just 
like imperfect self-defense in § 76-5-203(4), and like all affirmative defenses proclaims 
that even if the State can prove the elements of the underlying crime, the defendant in 
these circumstances is not guilty of the underlying crime because his conduct was less 
blameworthy. For all practical purposes, special mitigation, like imperfect self-defense in 
§ 76-5-203(4), is and should be considered an affirmative defense, even if the Legislature 
failed to so designate it as such. 
Drej asserts that special mitigation under § 76-5-205.5 provides for an affirmative 
defense which the Legislature has improperly, or at least misleadingly, labeled 
'mitigation,' presumably in an attempt to avoid placing the burden on the State. While a 
defendant is properly required to present and support mitigating factors before a 
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sentencing judge once guilt is established in order to mitigate punishment, his due 
process rights are violated by the statute's requirement that he prove to the jury's 
satisfaction that he be acquitted of the charged offense and that he is entitled to 
conviction of a different, lesser offense. Because special mitigation under § 76-5-205.5 
operates like the other enumerated statutory defenses and has an effect on the guilt or 
innocence of the accused like those other defenses, the special mitigation provisions of § 
76-5-205.5 should be considered an affirmative defense. Defendants should be afforded 
all the protections under the statute that are enjoyed by other defendants asserting 
affirmative defenses that are guaranteed by the Constitution of Utah and codified in Utah 
statutory law. 
ii) Special mitigation as an alternative means of proving manslaughter. 
If the Court disagrees that special mitigation is an affirmative defense mislabeled 
'mitigation' Drej asserts that special mitigation is merely an alternative method of 
proving manslaughter (or the other applicable reduced charges) as described in § 76-5-
205(l)(c) (and § 76-5-203(2)(f)). Essentially there are three ways to be found guilty of 
manslaughter. The first is to recklessly cause the death of another person. Second is to 
commit a homicide which would be murder, but the offense is reduced pursuant to the 
imperfect self-defense in § 76-5-203(4). Finally, one can be guilty of manslaughter by 
committing "murder, but special mitigation is established under Section 76-5-205.5." 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-205(c). Special mitigation manslaughter applies where a 
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homicide which would otherwise constitute murder is committed under circumstances 
that are not legally justified by a defense, like defense of person, but the defendant acts 
under a delusion caused by mental illness that would provide a legal justification for the 
homicide had the circumstances been as the delusion caused him to believe. UTAH CODE 
ANN. §§ 76-2-402, 76-5-205, 76-5-205.5. 
So, just as a person who successfully defends a murder charge by raising imperfect 
self-defense is in fact only guilty of manslaughter, a person who successfully defends a 
murder charge by raising special mitigation is in fact only guilty of manslaughter. A 
defendant in either of these situations is at no point a murderer. Because of a mistaken 
belief, arising from delusion or not, the defendant has never committed murder, he has 
committed a homicide thinking the killing was justified which, according to § 76-5-
203(4) and § 76-5-205 is only manslaughter. The fact that the State charges the 
defendant with murder does not change the fact that if the underlying elements are proved 
and either imperfect self-defense or special mitigation are shown the conviction is for 
manslaughter, not justified murder or murder reduced by mitigation. 
Under the special mitigation statute the factfinder "return[s] a verdict on the 
reduced charge[.]" UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-205.5(5)(a). In other words, the jury does 
not, as the State would argue, find the defendant guilty of murder yet punished as 
manslaughter because of mitigating factors. Instead the jury's verdict is one of guilt on 
the reduced charge, guilt on manslaughter. At no point, if the elements of special 
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mitigation are found, is a defendant guilty of the greater charge. Because of the 
bifurcated nature of a criminal trial the guilt phase is not the time to mitigate punishment. 
Instead any mitigation at that point is concerned with the guilt of the defendant. 
In State v. Kay, 111 P.2d 1294 (Utah 1986) this Court explained a bifurcated trial 
with respect to a capital case. The defendant in Kay pled guilty to capital homicide in 
exchange for a promise that he would not be sentenced to death. Kay, 111 P.2d at 1295. 
Later the State changed its position and the trial court ruled that it was not bound by the 
plea agreement and that a death sentence was still available. Id. On the subject of capital 
bifurcated trials this Court said "the defendant's guilt or innocence is determined in the 
first phase, while the penalty of death or life imprisonment is determined in the second." 
Id. at 1297. This principle is key when considering what special mitigation actually is. 
Special mitigation is not a way of mitigating a sentence or punishment, as is seen 
during the sentencing phase where a series of aggravating factors are weighed against a 
series of mitigating factors to determine whether a reduced sentence is appropriate. 
Black's defines mitigation of punishment as "[a] reduction in punishment due to 
mitigating circumstances that reduce the criminal's level of culpability, such as the 
existence of no prior convictions." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1024 (8th ed. 2004). In 
this respect special mitigation is not like traditional 'mitigation' at all. 
Special mitigation is a matter of guilt relating to the underlying charged crime, 
which if present prohibits the jury from finding guilt on the greater charge. Drej would 
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again refer to the Swenson case, where the language of the statute purported to create a 
benefit to a defendant that was already proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 
However the Court found that the statute in fact struck at the heart of the verdict because 
it was concerned with culpability. State v. Swenson, 838 P.2d 1136, 1138 (Utah 1992). 
As in Swenson, special mitigation is actually concerned with the culpability of the 
defendant, not merely with the punishment and thus the burden must remain on the State. 
Although special mitigation, or the lack thereof, is not an element of murder, the 
existence of special mitigation is and element of manslaughter. {See R. 0194). In this 
case, Drej's guilt on the charge of murder not only depends on the jury finding that he 
"intentionally or knowingly caused the death of another" but also "find by a unanimous 
vote that special mitigation has not been established." UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-203, 76-
5-205.5. Because it is presented during the guilt phase and has a direct influence of the 
guilt of the defendant, special mitigation should be seen as an element of the reduced 
charge of manslaughter. 
C. Because special mitigation is either an affirmative defense or the 
substantive crime of manslaughter, due process requires that the burden of 
proof be placed upon the State to prove the absence of special mitigation 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
As noted above, the Due Process Clause of the Utah Constitution requires that all 
elements of a crime, including the absence of affirmative defenses, must be established 
by the State. In State v. Lopes, 980 P.2d 191, 195 (Utah 1999) this Court ruled that u[a]s 
both a state and federal constitutional matter, we conclude that due process requires that 
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the prosecution prove every element of the charged crimes beyond a reasonable doubt." 
See UTAH CONST. ART. I, § 7; U.S. CONST. AMEND. V, XIV; see also State v. Herrera, 
895 P.2d 359, 368 (Utah 1995) ("due process mandates that the prosecution prove every 
element of the charged crimes beyond a reasonable doubt."); State v. Swenson, 838 P.2d 
1136, 1138 (Utah 1992) (holding that State has burden of proving all elements of a crime 
including disproving "exceptions" when the issue is raised); State v. Starks, 627 P.2d 88, 
92 (Utah 1981) ("A fundamental precept of our criminal law is that the state must prove 
all elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt"). 
The State has argued that the lack of an affirmative insanity defense does not 
violate federal or state due process citing the Herrera case. (See R. 0343). In 1995 this 
Court addressed Utah's limited insanity defense in the case of State v. Herrera, 895 P.2d 
359 (Utah 1995) (special mitigation was enacted in 1999). In Herrera the defendants, 
both charged with murder, claimed Utah's "mens rea model violate[d] federal due 
process because a defendant cannot rely on insanity as a basis for nonresponsibility for 
the crime unless he suffers from a form of insanity which serves to negate the mens rea 
element of the crime." Herrera, 895 P.2d at 363. The defendants also claimed the lack of 
a substantial insanity defense betrayed Utah's long history of compassion for the 
mentally ill. Herrera, 895 P.2d at 366. The Court rejected both these claims noting 
federal due process did not require a state to have any insanity defense beyond the mens 
rea model. The Court also stated Utah's history of recognizing the insanity defense did 
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not give the defendant the "vested right to a defense simply because it was previously 
available." Herrera, 859 P.2d at 366. 
While Drej is compelled to accept the Herrera holding that substantive due process 
does not require Utah to provide a complete insanity defense beyond the mens rea model, 
he is nevertheless entitled to due process with respect to the State's alternative found in § 
76-5-205.5. In Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956) the U.S. Supreme Court ruled 
that while there was no federal constitutional requirement that a state provide a right to 
appellate review, "a state that does grant appellate review can[not] do so in a way that 
discriminates against some convicted defendants on account of their poverty." In other 
words, if a state provides any appellate review it must provide access to all defendants 
equally. Similarly, because Utah has created an affirmative defense for mentally ill 
persons, due process requires that such mentally ill defendants not be denied due process 
in the presentation and determination of that defense. 
The Herrera Court further explained that because the mens rea insanity defense did 
not place any burden upon a defendant, but merely provided an opportunity to contest an 
element already placed within the State's burden, no due process concerns were raised. 
Herrera, 859 P.2d at 368. But here, unlike Herrera, § 76-5-205.5 does place a burden of 
persuasion on defendants in spite of contradictory holdings of this Court and the 
provisions of § 76-1-501 and § 76-1-502, thus denying Drej due process guaranteed him 
by both the federal and Utah constitutions. 
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For these reasons, the burden shifting function of § 76-5-205.5(5)(a) should be 
ruled unconstitutional and the trial court in this case should be instructed to treat special 
mitigation as an affirmative defense. This Court should hold that, if Drej presents 
evidence of the affirmative defense of special mitigation set out in § 76-5-205.5,the jury 
should be instructed that the State bears the burden of proving, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, that he is not entitled to special mitigation. 
2. The burden of proof provision of Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-205.5(5)(a) was 
improperly enacted and violates the Doctrine of Separation of Powers. 
A. Utah Constitution Article VIII Section 4 designates the adoption of rules of 
procedure to the Supreme Court and allows the Legislature to amend a rule 
of procedure previously adopted by the Supreme Court only by a two-thirds 
majority in both houses. 
Article V, Section 1 of the Constitution of Utah provides: "The powers of the 
government of the State of Utah shall be divided into three distinct departments, the 
Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial; and no person charged with the exercise of 
powers properly belonging to one of these departments, shall exercise functions 
appertaining to either of the others, except in the cases herein expressly directed or 
permitted." Article VIII, Section 4 of the Constitution of Utah describes the separation of 
some of those powers: "The Supreme Court shall adopt rules of procedure and evidence 
to be used in the courts of the state and shall by rule manage the appellate process. The 
Legislature may amend the Rules of Procedure and Evidence adopted by the Supreme 
Court upon a vote of two-thirds of all members of both houses of the Legislature." 
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In the absence of an express constitutional direction or permission, the Legislature 
of Utah is not authorized to adopt rules of procedure or evidence to be used in the courts 
of the State. In order for the Legislature to influence rules of procedure or evidence, that 
body may only amend the existing Rules of Procedure or Rules of Evidence already 
promulgated by the Supreme Court; and such an amendment requires that a two-thirds 
majority in both houses of the Legislature pass the rule. "Fully consistent with the 
familiar separation of powers doctrine, there is only a limited role for the Legislature in 
all of this" (the creation of rules of procedure), "and that is the authority to "amend the 
Rules of Procedure ... adopted by the Supreme Court upon a vote of two-thirds of all 
members of both houses of the Legislature." Express Recovery Services, Inc. v. Shewell, 
2007 UT App 3181| 13, 171 P.3d 451, 456 (citing UTAH CONST, ART. VIII, § 4). Beyond 
the power to amend those rules, the Legislature has no power to control the courts or the 
rales by which the courts operate. 
This Court has articulated a three-part test for analyzing whether a law violates the 
separation of powers in West Jordan City v. Goodman, 2006 UT 27 ]f 26, 135 P.3d 874, 
881. "First, are the [actors] in question charged with the exercise of powers properly 
belonging to one of the three branches of government?" Goodman, at f 26. Here the 
conduct in question is the act of creating a burden of proof in a criminal statute. Clearly 
this satisfies part one. 
"Second, is the function that the statute has given the [actors] one appertaining to 
25 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
another branch of government?" Goodman, at ]f 26. Drej argues that burden-shifting is a 
procedural change and is either an adoption of a entirely new standard with respect to 
mentally ill and delusional defendants or is an amendment to the general rule placing the 
burden of proving guilt on the State and that adopting rules or procedure is a function 
limited to the Judicial branch. The State argued at the trial court that special mitigation is 
"simply" a criminal statute and not a rule of evidence or procedure. (R. 0291). Drej does 
not challenge the Legislature's creation of special mitigation generally, only the 
placement of the burden of proof and the weight of that burden on him because these 
functions are matters of procedure reserved to the Judiciary. 
"The third and final step in the analysis asks: if the answer to both of the above 
questions is "yes," does the constitution "expressly" direct or permit exercise of the 
otherwise forbidden function? If not, article V, section 1 is transgressed." Goodman, at \ 
26. Drej admits that the Utah Constitution does expressly direct the Legislature to amend 
rules of procedure. However, it requires a two-thirds vote in both houses. Accordingly, 
the Legislature's failure in this respect makes the procedural function of § 76-5-205.5 
void without infringing on the Legislature's ability to enact the substantive portion of 
special mitigation. I 
In the recent decision, Burns v. Boyden, 2006 UT 14, 133 P.3d 370, this Court 
recognized the claim that rules of evidence and procedure passed by the Legislature are 
subject to constitutional scrutiny. "We have not previously addressed the issue of whether 
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these or other procedural or evidentiary statutes are valid in light of article VIII, section 4 
of the Utah Constitution. Article VIII, section 4 vests in the Utah Supreme Court both 
the authority and the duty to 'adopt rules of procedure and evidence to be used in the 
courts of the state' and reserves to the Legislature only the authority to 'amend the Rules 
of Procedure and Evidence adopted by the Supreme Court upon a vote of two-thirds of all 
members of both houses of the Legislature.'" Burns v. Boyden, 2006 UT 14 at fn.3, citing 
U.C.A. 1953, CONST. ART. VIII, § 4. The case was decided on other grounds but left 
open the option to invalidate statutes on these constitutional grounds. Drej contends that 
his case is an opportunity to rule on this constitutional matter. 
The next year, in Carbaugh v. Asbestos Corp. Ltd., 2007 UT 65, ]f 19, 167 P.3d 
1063, referring to the Court's authority to promulgate rules of procedure and evidence, 
this Court said that "[a] statutory scheme promulgated by the legislature may intrude on 
that constitutional grant of authority only under limited circumstances[.]" This Court was 
considering the Legislature's power to pass a law that interfered with a Rule of Evidence 
and found lawmakers' power in that area is at least limited if not altogether restricted by 
Article V Section 1 and by Article VIII Section 4 of the Utah Constitution. 
The Court is given exclusive authority to adopt rules of procedure and evidence. 
The term adopt connotes the idea of creation, to make a rule for the first time. The 
burden of proof function of § 76-5-205.5(5)(a) may be considered an adoption of a rule 
because there was not an explicit rule of procedure already in existence meant to apply to 
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the specific defense related to persons suffering from delusions charged with murder. If 
this Court concludes that the procedural burden shifting function of § 76-5-205.5(5)(a) 
created an altogether new rule of procedure, it should find that the Legislature thus 
adopted the procedural rule in violation of Article VIII section 4. 
The term amend connotes the idea of changing an existing rule. The State has 
described the term amend with reference to the Legislature's power as ua change made by 
addition, deletion or correction." (R. 0291 citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY.) The 
burden of proof function of § 76-5-205.5 might alternatively be considered an 
amendment to the default rules set out in § 76-1-501 and § 76-1-502, which require 
defenses and affirmative defenses to be negated beyond a reasonable doubt by the State 
once the issue is raised. By placing a burden of proof on a defendant the Legislature has 
changed the general rule of procedure established in § 76-1-501 and 502 by addition. 
The rule now essentially says that the State bears the burden of proving essential 
elements and disproving defenses except mistaken justification by delusional defendants. 
If this Court concludes that the burden shifting function of § 76-5-205.5(5)(a) modified 
the provisions of § 76-1-501 and § 76-1-502, it may find the Legislature has amended a 
rule of procedure. 
Before the trial court, the State has argued that because § 76-5-205.5 is not 
contained in the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure or the Utah Rules of Evidence, the 
statute is not a rule of procedure or evidence and thus, the Legislature has not violated 
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separation of powers or usurped the Supreme Court's power to adopt rales. (R. 0291). 
The State has also argued that because the Legislature did not amend the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure or the Utah Rules of Evidence there cannot be a violation of Article 
VIII's requirement that such an amendment must pass by a two-thirds vote. (R. 0291). 
These arguments would render the purpose of the Article VIII useless, allowing 
the Legislature to act without respect to the constitutional separation of powers in 
Articles V and VIII so long as it places its adopted rales of procedure or evidence outside 
the 'Rules of Procedure' and 'Rules of Evidence.' That argument would allow the 
Legislature to amend any procedural or evidentiary rale by a simple majority yet avoid 
the restriction in Articles V and VIII. To allow this type of manipulation would extend 
the Legislature's power and frustrate the separation of powers. 
C. The Legislature's amendment/adoption in § 76-5-205.5(5)(a) of a rule of 
procedure violates the separation of powers provisions either as an adoption 
of a procedural rule or as an amendment of a procedural rule. 
This Court, in Petty v. Clark, 192 P.2d 589 (Utah 1948), defined the distinction 
between substance and procedure. A law is substantive if it creates, defines and regulates 
the rights and duties of the parties and may give rise to a cause of action, procedural law 
pertains to and prescribes the practice and procedure of the legal machinery by which the 
substantive law is determined or made effective. Petty, 192 P.2d at 594-595. In 
Brickyard Homeowners v Gibbons Reality Co., 668 P.2d 535, 539 (Utah 1983), the Court 
defined procedure as the course, form, manner, means, method, mode, order, process or 
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steps by which a party enforces substantive rights and defined substantive principles 
which fix and declare the primary rights of individuals with respect to their persons and 
their property. 
Designating which party bears the burden of proof and the required weight of the 
burden are the means and method the courts use to enforce or arrive at proper allocations 
of substantive rights. In a criminal case, the proof beyond a reasonable doubt burden of 
proof placed on the government is the means of enforcing a criminal defendant's 
substantive due process rights. 
The United States Supreme Court has, on several occasions, at least indirectly, 
referred to the burden of proof and its function as a procedural entity and within a court's 
sphere of control. In Metropolitan Life Insurance v. Glenn, 128 S.Ct. 2343, 2345 (2008) 
the Court referred to burden-of-proof rules as special procedural rules that it has the 
power to create. In Jones v. U.S., 526 US 227, 243 (1999) the Court identified the burden 
of proof as a "required procedure for finding the facts" and distinguished it from the 
legislature's ability to "identify conduct they wish to characterize as criminal or define 
the facts whose proof is essential to the establishment of criminal liability." These 
passing references show the Supreme Court's view that the burden of proof is a 
procedural function and not a substantive right. 
In State v. Banner, 111 P.2d 1325, 1333 (Utah 1986), this Court examined Utah 
Rule of Evidence 609(a)(1), adopted by the Supreme Court, in relation to Utah Code 
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Annotated § 78-24-9, passed by the Utah Legislature. The Court ruled that because part 
of § 78-24-9 was inconsistent with Utah Rule of Evidence 609 it must be a rule of 
evidence and thus, was superseded by rule 609. In this case the burden of proof function 
of § 76-5-205.5(5)(a) is inconsistent with § 76-1-501 and § 76-1-502, each a rule of 
procedure, and should therefore be considered a rule of procedure itself. Because the 
burden of proof function of § 76-5-205.5(5)(a) changes the meaning of the general 
burden of proof requirements set out in § 76-1-501 and § 76-1-502 and contradicts the 
aforementioned holdings of the Utah Supreme Court, it should be considered an attempt 
to either create or alter a procedural rule. 
Special mitigation under Utah Code Annotated § 76-5-205.5 was enacted in the 
Legislature's general session of 1999 as a part of Senate Bill 20, MITIGATION FOR 
MENTALLY ILL OFFENDERS.1 It was passed in the Senate by a vote of 26 yeas, 0 
nays, and 3 absent or not voting.2 It passed in the House of Representatives by a vote of 
47 yeas, 21 nays, and 7 absent or not voting.3 Thus, the bill passed by more than two-
thirds majority in the Senate but by less than two-thirds majority in the House of 
Representatives. 
The general rale in Utah is that each element of an offense must be proved beyond 
a reasonable doubt - including defenses and affirmative defenses. See UTAH CODE ANN. 
1
 Laws of the State of Utah, 1999, General Session of the 53rd Legislature, Chapter 2. 
2
 State of Utah Senate Journal, 1999 General Session of the 53rd Legislature, page 169. 
3
 Journal of the House of Representatives of the State of Utah, 53rd Legislature, 1999 
General Session, pages 306-07. 
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§ 76-1-501, 502. The burden of proof function in § 76-5-205.5(5)(a) prescribes a 
different rale of procedure. Thus, the statute either amended the existing burden of proof 
or adopted a wholly new rule. If the effect of § 76-5-205.5(5)(a) was that it amended 
existing rules of procedure, the amending portion of the law (the burden shifting portion) 
violates the Constitution of Utah Article VIII, Section 4 because it was enacted by less 
than a two-thirds vote of both of the houses of the Utah Legislature. 
If, on the other hand, the effect of § 76-5-205.5(5)(a) was the creation of a wholly 
new rule of procedure, it violates the distribution of powers provisions of the Constitution 
of Utah Article V, Section 1. While Drej does not challenge the Legislature's power to 
create an affirmative defense for mentally ill persons charged with murder, he argues that 
the Legislature's attempt to place the burden of persuasion on defendants is 
unconstitutional, unenforceable, and superceded by existing rales of procedure, whether 
as an amendment to existing rules or as an adoption of a new rale. 
3. Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-205.5(5)(a) violates Drej's right to equal protection 
of the United States Constitution and the Uniform Application of Laws of the Utah 
Constitution. 
When challenging a statute on equal protection grounds a defendant must 
demonstrate that the statute either: (1) operates to their peculiar disadvantage as members 
of a suspect class, (2) impermissibly interferes with their exercise of a fundamental right, 
or (3) is not rationally related to a legitimate state interest. See City of New Orleans v. 
Dukes, All U.S. 297, 303, 96 S.Ct. 2513, 2516-17, 49 L.Ed.2d 511 (1976). Here, Drej 
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argues that special mitigation violates equal protection in all three ways. When a statute 
fails to treat similarly situated individuals similarly the law must be reasonably necessary 
to further a legitimate legislative goal or it violates the uniform operation of laws 
provided by Article 1 Section 24 of the Utah Constitution. Drej asserts that the burden-
shifting of special mitigation fails this test as well. "Equal Protection Clause of the 
United States Constitution and the uniform operation of laws provision of the Utah 
Constitution" are "substantially parallel" except at times the uniform operation of laws is 
"more rigorous." State v. Merrill, 2005 UT 34,131, 114 P.3d 585, 592. 
A. Special mitigation violates equal protection and uniform operation of laws 
because the mentally ill are a either a suspect class or a quasi-suspect class 
which gives rise to strict or intermediate scrutiny. 
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of 
the United States commands that no state shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction 
the equal protection of the laws, which is essentially a direction that all persons similarly 
situated should be treated alike." City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 
U.S. 432, 439, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 3254, 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985), citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 
U.S. 202, 216, 102 S.Ct. 2382, 2394, 72 L.Ed.2d 786 (1982). The equal protection clause 
prevents a state from enacting a law that denies any person equal protection unless there 
is a reason to distinguish that person or group from the general population. Depending on 
the nature of the distinction or classification the reasons need different levels of 
justification. "If a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, we 
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will uphold the legislative classification so long as it bears a rational relation to some 
legitimate end." itomer v. Evens, 517 U.S 620, 631, 116 S.Ct. 1620, 1627, 134 L.Ed.2d 
855 (1996). However, "[w]henever a state law infringes a constitutionally protected right, 
we undertake intensified equal protection scrutiny of that law." Attorney General of New 
Yorkv. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898, 904, 106 S.Ct. 2317, 2321, 90 L.Ed.2d 899 (1986) 
(citations omitted). This case presents both suspect class issues and fundamental rights 
and must be examined under an elevated level of scrutiny. 
Drej asserts that the mentally ill should be considered either a suspect class or a 
quasi-suspect class. The traditional indicia of suspectness, according to Regents of 
University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 357, 98 S.Ct. 2733, 2782, 57 L.Ed.2d 
750 (1978), are that a suspect class is "saddled with disabilities," "subjected to [] a 
history of purposeful unequal treatment," and "relegated to [] a position of political 
powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political 
process." See also San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 93 
S.Ct. 1278, 36 L.Ed.2d 16 (1973). Although these factors addressed in Bakke were 
established to emphasize the unfair treatment that racial minorities have traditionally 
received, those same factors appropriately describe the treatment of the mentally ill and 
their inability to protect their interests in a democratic fashion. Accordingly, the mentally 
ill should be considered a suspect class and that laws that classify people with regard to 
their mental illnesses should receive elevated scrutiny in order to determine whether or 
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not such laws violate equally protection mandates. In the alternative Drej would argue 
that the mentally ill should qualify for quasi-suspect class protection. 
When a statute makes a classification based on a suspect class "these laws are 
subjected to strict scrutiny and will be sustained only if they are suitably tailored to serve 
a compelling state interest." City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 
at 440. See also McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192, 185 S.Ct. 283, 288, 13 
L.Ed.2d 222 (1964); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 91 S.Ct. 1848, 29 L.Ed.2d 
534 (1971). "To withstand intermediate scrutiny, a statutory classification must be 
substantially related to an important governmental objective." Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 
456,461, 108 S.Ct 1910, 1914, 100L.Ed.2d465 (1988). See also Craig v. Boren, 429 
U.S. 190, 197, 97 S.Ct. 451, 465-57, 50 L.Ed.2d 397 (1976). In either case, under strict 
or intermediate scrutiny, the State's interest and the relationship the classification made 
in special mitigation has to that interest will not satisfy these heightened levels of 
scrutiny. 
B. Special mitigation violates federal equal protection because the right to 
present a criminal defense and the right to the presumption of innocence until 
proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt are fundamental rights and 
classifications that infringe fundamental rights are subject to strict scrutiny. 
Drej also claims that the right to present a criminal defenses should be considered 
a fundamental right. In San Antonio Independent School Dist. V. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 
93 S.Ct. 1278, 36 L.Ed.2d 16 (1973) the United States Supreme Court, in denying that 
public education was a fundamental right, said u[t]he Court today does not 'pick out 
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particular human activities, characterize them as 'fundamental/ and give them added 
protection... 'To the contrary, the Court simply recognizes, as it must, an established 
constitutional right, and gives to that right no less protection than the Constitution itself 
demands." Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 31 {citing Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 642, 
89 S.Ct. 1322, 1335, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969). 
In Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 76 S.Ct. 585, 100 L.Ed. 891 (1956) the United 
States Supreme Court recognized a constitutional right to have access to the criminal 
justice system. Illinois had required that criminal defendants purchase transcripts of their 
trial record in order to file an appeal. The defendants filed a petition claiming that they 
had been denied access to the criminal justice system because of their inability to afford a 
transcript and the Court agreed that the "constitutional guaranties of due process and 
equal protection both call for procedures in criminal trials which allow no invidious 
discriminations between persons and different groups of persons. Both equal protection 
and due process emphasize the central aim of our entire judicial system-all people 
charged with crime must, so far as the law is concerned, stand on an equality before the 
bar of justice in every American court." Griffin, 351 U.S. at 589-590 {quoting Chambers 
v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 241, 60 S.Ct. 472, 479, 84 L.Ed. 716 (1940)). 
Drej contends that this fundamental right of equal access to the protections of the 
criminal justice system protects him from the burden shifting function of § 76-5-
205.5(5)(a) unless the State can show that the reason for the distinction survives strict 
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scrutiny. "Whenever a state law infringes a constitutionally protected right, we undertake 
intensified equal protection scrutiny of that law." Attorney General of New York v. Soto-
Lopez, 476 U.S. at 904. In this case, where the constitutionally protected rights to present 
a criminal defense and to have his guilt proven beyond a reasonable doubt with the State 
bearing the burden, the Court should ask "whether the distinction drawn by the State" 
between delusional mentally ill homicide defendants alleging mistaken defense and 
homicide defendants without mental illness burdens that right. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. at 
904. Drej argues that the distinction does burden his right to be proved guilty by the 
State and thus the State should be required to "come forward with a compelling 
justification." Id. 
Drej also argues that special mitigation violates equal protection because the right 
to have each element of a defense, including an affirmative defense in Utah, proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt is a fundamental right protected by the constitutions of both 
Utah and the United States. Utah has recognized that the State bearing the burden of 
proving all elements of a crime, including disproving defenses and affirmative defenses, 
is a "fundamental precept of our criminal law[.]" State v. Starks, 627 P.2d 88, 92 (Utah 
1981) (citing State v. Torres, 619 P.2d 694 (Utah 1980)). When a law's classification 
jeopardizes the exercise of a fundamental right it warrants heightened scrutiny, forcing 
the state to justify the law and its classification. Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 
383 U.S. 663, 670, 86 S.Ct. 1079, 1083, 16 L.Ed.2d 169 (1966) (citing Skinner v. State of 
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Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541, 62 S.Ct. 1110, 1113, 86 L.Ed. 1655 (1942)). 
Drej contends that there is no compelling state interest in requiring him, and other 
delusional mentally ill defendants, to persuade a jury of their affirmative defenses while 
the State bears the burden for non-mentally ill persons presenting the same defense. 
C. Special mitigation violates federal equal protection because the burden of 
proof function is not rationally related to a legitimate state interest. 
If this Court should refuses to accept that the mentally ill are a suspect or a quasi-
suspect class, that the right to present a criminal defense is fundamental, or that the right 
to be proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt is a fundamental right, Drej asserts that the 
burden shifting provisions of § 76-5-205.5(5)(a) are unconstitutional under the less 
rigorous rational basis test. In a rational basis review "the burden is upon the challenging 
party to negative any reasonable conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational 
basis for classification." Board of Trustees of University of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 
356, 367, 121 S.Ct. 955, 964, 148 L.Ed.2d 866 (2001). 
Drej argues there is no legitimate, much less a compelling state interest in 
requiring him to prove his affirmative defense while non-mentally ill defendants need 
not. Drej argues there is no reasonable basis to distinguish between special mitigation 
and other affirmative defenses, particularly § 76-5-203(4). "When the law lays an 
unequal hand on those who have committed intrinsically the same quality of offense and 
sterilizes one and not the other, it has made as an invidious a discrimination as if it had 
selected a particular race or nationality for oppressive treatment." Skinner v. State of 
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Oklahoma ex rel Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541, 62 S.Ct. 1110, 86 L.Ed. 1655 (1942) 
(Court overruled a law that distinguished between those guilty of larceny by fraud and 
those guilty of embezzlement). Because there is no reasonable basis to treat these 
similarly situated persons differently, Drej is denied equal protection of the law. Special 
mitigation under § 76-5-205.5 is unconstitutional insofar as it places the burden of proof 
upon him while the State bears the burden for who raise essentially the same defense. 
D. Special mitigation violates Utah's uniform operation of law because it 
treats similarly situated defendants dissimilarly. 
Article I, Section 24 of the Constitution of Utah guarantees "[a]ll laws of a general 
nature shall have uniform operation." This constitutional protection requires that 
similarly situated individuals be treated alike under the law unless there is a 
constitutionally legitimate basis for treating them differently. Greenwood v City of North 
Salt Lake, 817 P.2d 816, 821 (Utah 1991); Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 670 (Utah 
1984). "In order for a law to be constitutional under the uniform operation of laws 
provision, it is not enough that it be uniform on its face. What is critical is that the 
operation of the law be uniform... [W]hen persons are similarly situated, it is 
unconstitutional to single out one person or group of persons from among the larger class 
on the basis of a tenuous justification that has little or no merit." Gallivan v. Walker, 54 
P.3d 1069, 1085 (2002), citing Malan, 693 P.2d at 671 (internal quotes and citations 
omitted). 
When a statute is either not uniform on its face or fails to operate in a uniform 
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manner, the statute is subjected to a similar analysis as the federal model. "Where a 
legislative enactment implicates a fundamental or critical right or creates classifications 
which are considered impermissible or suspect in the abstract, we apply a heightened 
degree of scrutiny." Gallivan, 54 P.3d at 1085 {quoting Ryan v. Gold Cross Services, 
Inc., 903 P.2d 423, 426 (Utah 1995)). "[I]n order for a discriminatory classification to be 
constitutional it must be reasonably necessary to further, and in fact must actually and 
substantially further, a legitimate legislative goal." Gallivan, 54 P.3d at 1086. 
Drej, here, asserts the same claims as argued under the similar federal guarantee, 
namely that the special mitigation statute both implicates a fundamental right (the right to 
a criminal defense) and creates a suspect classification by singling out the mentally ill. In 
the alternative, Drej argues that if the due process right to criminal defenses is not 
considered fundamental or the classification of the mentally ill is not considered suspect 
or quasi-suspect, the classification of the mentally ill in § 76-5-205.5 must still meet the 
rational basis standard. As argued above, shifting the burden of persuasion in § 76-5-
205.5(5)(a) serves neither a rational nor compelling State interest. 
i. Defendants asserting special mitigation under § 76-5-205.5 are 
treated dissimilarly to those asserting the affirmative defense under § 
76-5-203(4)(a). 
Mentally ill defendants asserting an entitlement to special mitigation under § 76-5-
205.5 are treated dissimilar to non-mentally ill defendants asserting an affirmative 
defense under § 76-5-203(4). This dissimilar treatment is best explained by illustration. 
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Imagine two defendants, each charged with murder for intentionally causing the death of 
another. Each defendant saw what he mistakenly believed to be an attack of an innocent 
third person. Each of the defendants believed that it was necessary to use deadly force in 
order to prevent the killing or serious injury of that innocent third person. Both 
defendants killed their victim based on their respective mistaken belief that his victim 
was going to kill the innocent third person. 
The first defendant, who is not mentally ill, asserts an affirmative defense of 
imperfect self-defense under § 76-5-203(4), claiming that a mistake of fact caused him to 
justifiably, albeit mistakenly, believe that deadly force was necessary to prevent death or 
serious bodily injury to an innocent third person as a result of the victim's apparent 
imminent use of unlawful deadly force. Utah Code Annotated § 76-5-203(4), by means 
of §§ 75-1-501 and 502, requires the State to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the 
defendant's belief was not reasonable under the circumstances. The important point is 
the burden to disprove the affirmative defense is on the State once the affirmative defense 
is raised. 
The other mentally ill defendant asserts special mitigation due to mental illness 
under § 76-5-205.5, claiming that a delusion caused him to mistakenly believe that 
deadly force was necessary to prevent death or serious injury to the innocent third person 
as a result of the victim's apparent imminent use of unlawful deadly force. Special 
mitigation in § 76-5-205.5(5)(a) requires the mentally ill defendant bear the burden of 
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persuasion to prove the existence not only of the delusion and the mental illness but also 
all the elements of the legal justification (the same elements the State must disprove for 
the first defendant). 
These two defendants are very similarly situated yet the law affords them very 
dissimilar protection. Both defendants actually believed that their use of deadly force 
was necessary and justified. Both engaged in the same action, knowing that they were 
using deadly force upon a person. Both defendants were mistaken about the reality of the 
circumstances. And, both defendants challenge their culpability based on what they 
believed to be the facts at the time of their conduct. Nevertheless, the mentally ill 
defendant is required to bear the burden of proof in his defense while the non-mentally ill 
defendant need only raise the issue and force the State to disprove the defense. 
These laws place defendants in similar situations in different classes based not on 
their conduct, because their conduct was the same, but on their mental health status. 
"The classification must rest upon some difference which bears a reasonable and just 
relation to the act in respect to which the classification is proposed, and can never be 
made arbitrarily and without any such basis. Arbitrary selection can never be justified by 
calling it classification." McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. at 190 (internal quotations 
omitted). There is no legitimate government interest in requiring a mentally ill 
defendant, like Drej, to bear the burden of persuasion to prove he is entitled to special 
mitigation where, if he was not mentally ill but merely mistaken as to his justification, the 
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State would bear the burden. It is unlikely that the mentally ill are less likely to pay heed 
to their delusions because they may bear the burden of proof in their defense. 
Further, if, as Drej has previously asserted, this Court finds that mentally ill 
persons are a suspect or quasi-suspect group or that access to otherwise generally 
available criminal defenses is a fundamental right, then elevated scrutiny applies and the 
State must prove that the discriminatory method of distinguishing the mentally ill from 
other criminal defendants was the least restrictive alternative to accomplishing a 
compelling government interest in order to survive a federal equal protection claim. 
"Utah's uniform operation of laws provision establishes different requirements than 
does the federal Equal Protection Clause. The most important of these requirements, for 
the present analysis, is the requirement that 6[f]or a law to be constitutional under [the 
provision], it is not enough that it be uniform on its face. What is critical is that the 
operation of the law be uniform. A law does not operate uniformly if 'persons similarly 
situated' are not 'treated similarly''".... Analysis under Utah's uniform operation of laws 
provision requires... "the statutory classifications and the different treatment given the 
classes must be based on differences that have a reasonable tendency to further the 
objectives of the statute." State v. Mohi, 901 P.2d 991, 997 (Utah 1995) (citing Malan, 
693 P.2d at 669). 
In this case the State cannot justify its differential treatment of mentally ill 
defendants because that treatment would not reasonably tend to further a State's interest. 
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If the State were trying to impose a greater burden on the mentally ill because their 
mistaken use of force to defend is based on a delusion as opposed to a mere mistake will 
not prevent delusional uses of force for defense. Placing the burden on a mentally ill 
defendant will not encourage mentally ill defendants to ignore their delusions for fear 
they will bear the burden in some future trial. 
In Herrera the Court noted that between two mentally ill defendants, one who kills 
and knows he is killing and the other who kills and thinks he is squeezing a grapefruit, 
the distinction in culpability justifies the unequal protection of law between the mens rea 
model found in § 76-2-305 and the notably absent insanity affirmative defense. See 
Herrera, 859 P.2d at 396. Herrera's discussion of equal protection is informative here 
because when special mitigation in § 76-5-205.5 is compared to the mistaken justification 
defense in § 76-5-203(4), the rational distinction dissolves. 
Here, Drej argues that between two defendants who mistake the circumstances ~ 
one who acts with deadly force in defense of another due to a mistake caused by 
misperception and the other who acts with deadly force in defense of another due to a 
mistake caused by a delusion caused by mental illness - there is no distinction in 
culpability. Drej argues that one would be hard pressed to differentiate the culpability 
between these two defendants and explain how this distinction furthers the health and 
safety of the public. Without a distinction in the culpability of these two types of 
defendants there is no justified unequal operation of law between the justified mistake 
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affirmative defense found in § 76-5-203(4) and the "special mitigation" provisions of § 
76-5-205.5. Without any reasonable justification the classification and differential 
treatment violates uniform operation of law. 
4. Utah Code Annotated § 76-5-205.5 need not be completely overruled because this 
Court can strike unconstitutional portion and leave the remainder intact. 
In the three previous sections Drej has claimed that the burden shifting function of 
Utah Code Annotated § 76-5-205.5(5)(a) is unconstitutional on either or all of three 
different grounds. If this Court finds any or all of these constitutional challenges 
convincing and holds the burden shifting function of § 76-5-205.5(5)(a) unconstitutional, 
Drej argues that the statute may be preserved by striking only the unconstitutional 
portion. The entire statute need not be ruled unconstitutional if the offending portion can 
be removed. "[I]f a portion of the statute might be saved by severing the part that is 
unconstitutional, such should be done." State v. Lopes, 1999 UT 24, f 18, 980 P.2d 191, 
196 (citation omitted). See also Gallivan v. Walker, 54 P.3d 1069 (Utah 2002) (if the 
remainder of a statute is separable and still furthers its intended purpose, the statute as it 
remains will be allowed to stand), Critchlow v. Monson, 131 P.2d 794 (Utah 1942), 
Midvale City Corp. v. Haltom, 2003 UT 26, fflf 53-54, 73 P.3d 334 (Utah 2003) cert 
denied, 540 U.S. 1049, 124 S.Ct. 82 (2003) (if a portion of the statute might be saved by 
severing the part that is unconstitutional, it should be done), In re State in Interest of 
Woodward, 384 P.2d 110, 113 (Utah 1963) (where there is no constitutional objection to 
the balance of the language and it is separable the remaining language may survive). 
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In order to determine whether or not the remainder of § 76-5-205.5 can be saved 
while the unconstitutional burden shifting function is severed, the legislative intent must 
be considered. "To determine if a statute is severable from its unconstitutional subsection, 
we look to legislative intent. If the intent is not expressly stated, we then turn to the 
statute itself, and examine the remaining constitutional portion of the statute in relation to 
the stricken portion. If the remainder of the statute is operable and still furthers the 
intended legislative purpose, the statute will be allowed to stand." Lopes, 980 P.2d at 196. 
While there is no mention of legislative intent to allow severability expressly 
within the text of § 76-5-205.5, Utah Code Annotated § 76-1-108 states: "If any 
provision of this act [referring to Title 76, The Utah Criminal Code], or the application of 
any provision to any person or circumstance, is held invalid, the remainder of this act 
shall not be affected." In other words, the Legislature's intent to allow this Court to 
strike any portion of the Criminal Code if it is invalid and leave the remainder unaffected 
is clear. Thus, if the invalid burden shifting function of § 76-5-205.5 must be removed, 
the Legislature intended to leave the rest of the statute intact and unaffected. In essence, 
Drej argues that all substantive elements of special mitigation should remain intact, and 
only the procedural burden of proof element found in subsection (5)(a) and the implicit 
placement of that burden upon the defendant should be excised. 
If the first Lopes test does not apply because the explicit intent of severability of § 
76-1-108 does not apply to § 76-5-205.5, or to severability within sections generally, then 
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the second analysis of Lopes should be considered. If, after the offending portions have 
been removed, the remaining portion still furthers the overall legislative purpose of the 
statute, then the severance is appropriate and the statute, as modified, should remain. 
Lopes at 196. 
Here, if the burden shifting function of special mitigation were removed, § 76-5-
205.5 would still function to reduce the charges for criminal homicide offenses based on 
delusion. A defendant who produced evidence of a delusion caused by mental illness 
would have the ability to have his charges reduced. According to the Legislative history 
the special mitigation defense was created for a number of reasons. First, it was created 
as a "hedge against the HerrercT decision because the decision not to require a more 
comprehensive insanity defense came down to one vote. (SB 20 Senate Floor Debate 
January 25, 1999, Creighton Horton). The Legislature wanted to ease the tension created 
by Herrera by adding another method of introducing evidence of mental illness in a 
defense so as to avoid it being overturned. Second, was that in order to attach a sense of 
fairness by allowing mentally ill defenders who suffer from a qualifying delusion to have 
the degree of their offense reduced. Id. By removing the burden shifting function these 
two purposes would still be served. 
The legislative intent to prevent a challenge to Herrera is served because there 
remains a means of introducing mental illness evidence into a defense. The legislative 
intent to provide fairness to a truly delusional defendant would remain intact and even be 
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extended because delusional defendants would be treated the same as those whose 
mistake is one of perception. The only real change would be the method by which the 
courts would proceed to factually establish culpability. 
Under either method established by Lopes, the unconstitutional burden-shifting 
portion of § 76-5-205.5 may be removed without having to rule the entire statute 
unconstitutional. In fact Defendant argues that the Court is obligated to leave the 
remainder intact. Gallivan v. Walker, 2002 UT 89 ^  87, 54 P.3d 1069. 
Drej asserts this Court should strike the following portions of § 76-5-205.5(5)(a): 
"If the trier of fact finds the elements of an offense as listed in subsection (5)(b) are 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt, and also that the existence of special mitigation under 
this section is established by a preponderance of the evidence, it shall return a verdict on 
the reduced charge as provided in Subsection (5)(b)." 
If these portions were stricken as an unconstitutional shifting of a burden of proof, the 
remaining text of the statute would sufficiently retain the function of providing a 
reduction of culpability for those mentally ill persons who commit a homicide under the 
influence of a qualifying delusion. The Court need not add any terms to the law nor 
require that the law be interpreted in any way contrary to the interpretation of the existing 
defenses or affirmative defenses contained in Title 76. Trial courts would then be able to 
issue jury instructions consistent with § 76-1-502(2), placing the burden of disproving the 
existence of special mitigation on the State once it is raised in the case. 
"Although a court cannot supply substantive terms that are absent from a statute, it 
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not only may, but must supply omitted procedural elements that are necessary to 
implement legislation consistent with constitutional requirements." Matter of a Criminal 
Investigation, 7th Dist. Court No. CS-1, 754 P.2d 633, 640 (Utah 1988) (emphasis added) 
(superseded by statute on other grounds) {citing Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Anderson, 
514 P.2d 217, 219 (1973)). See also Carlson v. Bos, 740 P.2d 1269, 1276 (Utah 1987); In 
re Boyer, 636 P.2d 1085, 1088 (Utah 1981). After striking the burden shifting function, 
in order to implement § 76-5-205.5 consistent with both the U.S. and Utah constitutions 
the Court should also include in its decision an explicit ruling that special mitigation, as 
modified, is an affirmative defense or an alternative means of proving manslaughter (or 
the other applicable reduced offenses) to be disproved beyond a reasonable doubt by the 
State once the defense is put at issue by the defendant. 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
Drej asks that this Court hold that Utah Code Annotated § 76-5-205.5(5)(a) is 
unconstitutional insofar as it places on defendants the burden to prove special mitigation 
and strike the offending portion with a ruling that special mitigation provided for in the 
statute should be considered an affirmative defense or an alternative means of proving 
manslaughter to ensure the burden of prove remains on the State. 
DATED this 13th day of August, 2009. 
THOMAS H. MEANS 
Counsel for Appellant 
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ADDENDA 
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United States Constitution - Amendment V 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, 
unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in 
the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or 
public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put 
in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a 
witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation. 
United States Constitution - Amendment XIV, Section 1 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No 
State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person 
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
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Utah Constitution - Article I, Section 7 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of 
law. 
Utah Constitution - Article I, Section 24 
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation. 
Utah Constitution - Article V, Section 1 
The powers of the government of the State of Utah shall be divided into three 
distinct departments, the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial; and no 
person charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these 
departments, shall exercise any functions appertaining to either of the others, 
except in the cases herein expressly directed or permitted. 
Utah Constitution - Article VIII, Section 4 
The Supreme Court shall adopt rules of procedure and evidence to be used in the 
courts of the state and shall by rule manage the appellate process. The Legislature 
may amend the Rules of Procedure and Evidence adopted by the Supreme Court 
upon a vote of two-thirds of all members of both houses of the Legislature. Except 
as otherwise provided by this constitution, the Supreme Court by rule may 
authorize retired justices and judges and judges pro tempore to perform any 
judicial duties. Judges pro tempore shall be citizens of the United States, Utah 
residents, and admitted to practice law in Utah. The Supreme Court by rule shall 
govern the practice of law, including admission to practice law and the conduct 
and discipline of persons admitted to practice law. 
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U.C.A. § 76-1-501 - Presumption of innocence—"Element of the offense" 
defined 
(1) A defendant in a criminal proceeding is presumed to be innocent until each 
element of the offense charged against him is proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 
In absence of such proof, the defendant shall be acquitted. 
(2) As used in this part the words "element of the offense" mean: 
(a) The conduct, attendant circumstances, or results of conduct proscribed, 
prohibited, or forbidden in the definition of the offense; 
(b) The culpable mental state required. 
(3) The existence of jurisdiction and venue are not elements of the offense but 
shall be established by a preponderance of the evidence. 
U.C.A. § 76-1-502 - Negating defense by allegation or proof—When not 
required 
Section 76-1-501 does not require negating a defense: 
(1) By allegation in an information, indictment, or other charge; or 
(2) By proof, unless: 
(a) The defense is in issue in the case as a result of evidence presented at 
trial, either by the prosecution or the defense; or 
(b) The defense is an affirmative defense, and the defendant has presented 
evidence of such affirmative defense. 
U.C.A. $ 76-5-203 - Murder 
(1) As used in this section, "predicate offense" means: 
(a) a clandestine drug lab violation under Section 58-37d-4 or 58-37d-5; 
(b) child abuse, under Subsection 76-5-109(2)(a), when the victim is 
younger than 18 years of age; 
(c) kidnapping under Section 76-5-301; 
(d) child kidnapping under Section 76-5-301.1; 
(e) aggravated kidnapping under Section 76-5-302; 
(f) rape of a child under Section 76-5-402.1; 
(g) object rape of a child under Section 76-5-402.3; 
(h) sodomy upon a child under Section 76-5-403.1; 
(i) forcible sexual abuse under Section 76-5-404; 
(j) sexual abuse of a child or aggravated sexual abuse of a child under 
Section 76-5-404.1; 
(k) rape under Section 76-5-402; 
(1) object rape under Section 76-5-402.2; 
(m) forcible sodomy under Section 76-5-403; 
(n) aggravated sexual assault under Section 76-5-405; 
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(o) arson under Section 76-6-102; 
(p) aggravated arson under Section 76-6-103; 
(q) burglary under Section 76-6-202; 
(r) aggravated burglary under Section 76-6-203; 
(s) robbery under Section 76-6-301; 
(t) aggravated robbery under Section 76-6-302; 
(u) escape or aggravated escape under Section 76-8-309; or 
(v) a felony violation of Section 76-10-508 or 76-10-508.1 regarding 
discharge of a firearm or dangerous weapon. 
(2) Criminal homicide constitutes murder if: 
(a) the actor intentionally or knowingly causes the death of another; 
(b) intending to cause serious bodily injury to another, the actor commits an 
act clearly dangerous to human life that causes the death of another; 
(c) acting under circumstances evidencing a depraved indifference to 
human life, the actor knowingly engages in conduct which creates a grave 
risk of death to another and thereby causes the death of another; 
(d)(i) the actor is engaged in the commission, attempted commission, or 
immediate flight from the commission or attempted commission of any 
predicate offense, or is a party to the predicate offense; 
(ii) a person other than a party as defined in Section 76-2-202 is killed in 
the course of the commission, attempted commission, or immediate flight 
from the commission or attempted commission of any predicate offense; 
and 
(iii) the actor acted with the intent required as an element of the predicate 
offense; 
(e) the actor recklessly causes the death of a peace officer or military 
service member in uniform while in the commission or attempted 
commission of: 
(i) an assault against a peace officer under Section 76-5-102.4; 
(ii) interference with a peace officer while making a lawful arrest 
under Section 76-8-305 if the actor uses force against a peace 
officer; or 
(iii) an assault against a military service member in uniform under 
Section 76-5-102.4; 
(f) commits a homicide which would be aggravated murder, but the offense 
is reduced pursuant to Subsection 76-5-202(4); or 
(g) the actor commits aggravated murder, but special mitigation is 
established under Section 76-5-205.5. 
(3)(a) Murder is a first degree felony. 
(b) A person who is convicted of murder shall be sentenced to 
imprisonment for an indeterminate term of not less than 15 years and which 
may be for life. 
(4)(a) It is an affirmative defense to a charge of murder or attempted murder that 
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the defendant caused the death of another or attempted to cause the death of 
another under a reasonable belief that the circumstances provided a legal 
justification or excuse for the conduct although the conduct was not legally 
justifiable or excusable under the existing circumstances. 
(b) The reasonable belief of the actor under Subsection (4)(a) shall be 
determined from the viewpoint of a reasonable person under the then 
existing circumstances. 
(c) This affirmative defense reduces charges only from: 
(i) murder to manslaughter; and 
(ii) attempted murder to attempted manslaughter. 
(5)(a) Any predicate offense described in Subsection (1) that constitutes a separate 
offense does not merge with the crime of murder. 
(b) A person who is convicted of murder, based on a predicate offense 
described in Subsection (1) that constitutes a separate offense, may also be 
convicted of, and punished for, the separate offense. 
U.C.A. § 76-5-205 - Manslaughter 
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes manslaughter if the actor: 
(a) recklessly causes the death of another; 
(b) commits a homicide which would be murder, but the offense is reduced 
pursuant to Subsection 76-5-203(4); or 
(c) commits murder, but special mitigation is established under Section 76-
5-205.5. 
(2) Manslaughter is a felony of the second degree. 
U.C.A. § 76-5-205,5 - Special mitigation reducing the level of criminal 
homicide offense—Burden of proof—Application to reduce offense 
(1) Special mitigation exists when the actor causes the death of another or attempts 
to cause the death of another: 
(a)(i) under circumstances that are not legally justified, but the actor acts 
under a delusion attributable to a mental illness as defined in Section 76-2-
305; 
(ii) the nature of the delusion is such that, if the facts existed as the 
defendant believed them to be in the delusional state, those facts 
would provide a legal justification for the defendant's conduct; and 
(iii) the defendant's actions, in light of the delusion, were reasonable 
from the objective viewpoint of a reasonable person ; or 
(b) under the influence of extreme emotional distress for which there is a 
reasonable explanation or excuse. 
(2) A defendant who was under the influence of voluntarily consumed, injected, or 
ingested alcohol, controlled substances, or volatile substances at the time of the 
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alleged offense may not claim mitigation of the offense under Subsection (l)(a) on 
the basis of mental illness if the alcohol or substance caused, triggered, or 
substantially contributed to the mental illness. 
(3) Under Subsection (l)(b), emotional distress does not include: 
(a) a condition resulting from mental illness as defined in Section 76-2-305; 
or 
(b) distress that is substantially caused by the defendant's own conduct. 
(4) The reasonableness of an explanation or excuse under Subsection (l)(b) shall 
be determined from the viewpoint of a reasonable person under the then existing 
circumstances. 
(5)(a) If the trier of fact finds the elements of an offense as listed in Subsection 
(5)(b) are proven beyond a reasonable doubt, and also that the existence of special 
mitigation under this section is established by a preponderance of the evidence, it 
shall return a verdict on the reduced charge as provided in Subsection (5)(b). 
(b) If under Subsection (5)(a) the offense is: 
(i) aggravated murder, the defendant shall instead be found guilty of 
murder; 
(ii) attempted aggravated murder, the defendant shall instead be 
found guilty of attempted murder; 
(iii) murder, the defendant shall instead be found guilty of 
manslaughter; or 
(iv) attempted murder, the defendant shall instead be found guilty of 
attempted manslaughter. 
(6)(a) If a jury is the trier of fact, a unanimous vote of the jury is required to 
establish the existence of the special mitigation. 
(b) If the jury does find special mitigation by a unanimous vote, it shall 
return a verdict on the reduced charge as provided in Subsection (5). 
(c) If the jury finds by a unanimous vote that special mitigation has not 
been established, it shall convict the defendant of the greater offense for 
which the prosecution has established all the elements beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
(d) If the jury is unable to unanimously agree whether or not special 
mitigation has been established, the result is a hung jury. 
(7)(a) If the issue of special mitigation is submitted to the trier of fact, it shall 
return a special verdict indicating whether the existence of special mitigation has 
been found. 
(b) The trier of fact shall return the special verdict at the same time as the 
general verdict, to indicate the basis for its general verdict. 
(8) Special mitigation under this section does not, in any case, reduce the level of 
an offense by more than one degree from that offense, the elements of which the 
evidence has established beyond a reasonable doubt. 
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FILED 
DEC 1 8 2007 
4JHDISTRICT \f 
STATE OF UTAH V 
8JTA! I COUNTY 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF UTAH, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
vs. 
ERYKDREJ, 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant. 
RULING ON DEFENDANT'S 
SPECIFIC REQUEST FOR 
INSTRUCTION REGARDING 
BURDEN OF PROOF 
Case No. 051402396 
Judge Lynn W. Davis 
This matter is before the Court on Defendant's Specific Request for Instruction 
Regarding Burden of Proof. This request relates to the burden of proof associated with the 
special mitigation statute in the Utah Criminal Code. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-2-5,5. Oral 
argument on the motion was held on June 13, 2007. Defendant was present, as were his 
attorneys Thomas Means and Anthony Howell, The State was represented by Jeflxey Buhman 
and Chad Grunander. Subsequent to the hearing, the Court requested supplemental briefing from 
the parties. The Court has considered the brief arguments provided by counsel and thoroughly 
reviewed the parties' memoranda, the relevant case law, and all applicable rules and statutory 
provisions. Now being fully advised, the Court enters the following ruling: 
I. 
Procedural History 
1. Defendant is charged with Criminal Homicide, Murder, in violation of Utah Code Ann, § 
76-5-203. 
2. On March 14, 2007, Defendant filed notice of his intent to assert entitlement to special 
mitigation under § 76-5-205.5. 
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3. This case was set for jury trial on April 30, May 1, 3, and 4, 2007 before Honorable 
Anthony Schofield. 
4. On April 30, 2007, Defendant filed "Defendant's Specific Request for Instruction 
Regarding Burden of Proof and Supporting Memorandum." 
5. A copy of the proposed special mitigation jury instruction is attached as Exhibit A, 
6. In light of the above, the jury trial was stricken, without date, and the Court instructed 
counsel relating to briefing deadlines. 
7. The "State's Response to Defendant's Request for Instruction Regarding Burden of 
Proof' was filed on May 21, 2007. 
8. Brief oral arguments were presented on June 13, 2007. Both sides, though the challenge 
appears to be one of first impression in the State of Utah, waived further oral arguments 
and submitted the issue on the briefing. 
9. After reviewing the memoranda submitted by counsel, the Court requested supplemental 
briefing to address the following questions: 
a. Is Utah the only jurisdiction in the country which allows special mitigation? 
b. What is the genesis of this jurisprudential concept? Please educate the court. 
c. If other jurisdictions allow special mitigation, please cite statutory law, case law, 
burden of proof, and highlight which party bears the burden of proof. How is 
special mitigation defined, if at all, in other jurisdictions? Have their statutory 
schemes withstood appellate review? 
d. If no comparable statutory schemes exist in sister states, how and why did this 
unique doctrine develop in the State of Utah? 
2 
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e. Is Utah's definition of special mitigation relied upon in this case, "acting under a 
delusion attributable to mental illness," considered a special mitigation in any 
other jurisdiction? Is it considered a defense in any other jurisdiction? 
f Lastly, discuss further the presumptive constitutionality of statutory language and 
the fact that trial courts are disinclined to tinker with the clear language and intent 
of the legislature. If declared unconstitutional, either as to the "preponderance of 
evidence" burden of proof standard or on the issue of which party has the burden 
of proof, isn't the entire statute rendered potentially void and wouldn't the concept 
of special mitigation be extinguished in Utah until the legislature chooses, if ever, 
to reenact it? 
10. The State submitted its supplemental briefing on October 5, 2007. Defendant submitted 
supplemental briefing on October 23, 2007. In addition, on December 11, 2007, 
Defendant filed a second supplemental brief, relying on State v. Spillers, 153 P.3d 315 
(Utah 2007). 
11. Counsel for the State of Utah submitted a "Notice to Submit for Decision" on November 
13,2007. 
12. At all stages the State of Utah was represented by Jeffrey R. Buhman and Chad E. 
Grunander, Utah County Attorneys. The Defendant, at all stages, was represented by 
Thomas H. Means and Anthony Howell, Utah County Public Defenders. 
n. 
Legal Analysis 
Defendant is charged with Criminal Homicide, Murder, in violation of § 76-5-203 and 
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Defendant has given notice of his intent to assert entitlement to special mitigation under § 76-5-
205.5. Section 76-5-205.5(4)(a) provides: 
If the trier of fact finds the elements of [murder] proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt, and also that the existence of special mitigation under 
this section is established by a preponderance of the evidence, it shall 
return a verdict on [manslaughter]. 
The Defendant, in his Specific Request for Instruction Regarding Burden of Proof, 
succinctly and briefly argued the following: Subsection 4(a) does not specify which party has the 
responsibility to carry the burden of establishing special mitigation facts by a preponderance of 
the evidence. Defendant assumes - and it seems reasonable to infer - that subsection 4(a) places 
that burden on the Defendant. To the extent § 76-5-205.5(4) purports to place upon Defendant 
the burden of proof of special mitigation facts in his criminal trial for Murder, the section 
violates Defendant's due process rights, violates Utah's constitutional scheme for separation of 
powers, denies Defendant equal protection of the law, and violates Utah statutory law. Because 
the section violates both the United States Constitution as well as the Constitution and statutes of 
Utah, this Court should refuse the State's request that the jury be instructed that Defendant bears 
the burden of proving special mitigation facts and should instinct the jury that it is required to 
find that special mitigation has been established unless the State has failed to prove, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, that special mitigation is not justified. 
The State of Utah responded briefly as follows: Section 76-5-205.5 does not violate due 
process because the Utah State Legislature has the authority to place "the burden of persuasion 
on defendants who claim incapacity as an excuse from customary criminal responsibility." Clark 
v. Arizona, 126 S.Ct. 2709,2732 (2006). The statute does not violate the separation of powers 
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because, under Article VII, Section 4 of the Utah Constitution, the Legislature "may amend the 
rules of Procedure and Evidence adopted by the Supreme Court." Finally, the statute does not 
violate equal protection because there is a "reasonable basis" for treating a defendant who 
invokes special mitigation differently from a defendant who invokes the insanity defense. State 
v. Herrera, 895 P.2d 359, 369 (Utah 1995). 
Defendant's central claim underpinning each of his arguments in support of his request 
for an instruction on burden of proof with respect to special mitigation, see Utah Code Ami. § 
76-5-2-5.5, is that special mitigation is a defense to murder. Defendant concedes that the special 
mitigation statute ostensibly requires him to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, the 
existence of special mitigation. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-205.5(4)(a). He contends, however, 
that by imposing on him the burden of proving the existence of special mitigation, the statute 
violates both federal and state constitutional provisions as well as Utah statutory law. 
Defendant's overarching argument is that due process requires that the prosecution prove his 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See InreWinship. 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) ("|T]he Due 
Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged."); State v. 
Sorenson, 758 P.2d 466, 468 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) ("Due Process requires the prosecution to 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt every fact necessary to constitute the crime charged."). See 
also Utah Code Ann, § 76-1-501(1). 
hi addition, "Utah [also] imposes on the prosecution the burden to disprove the existence 
of affirmative defenses beyond a reasonable doubt once the defendant has produced some 
evidence of the defense." State v. Wood. 648 P,2d 71, 82 n.7 (Utah 1982). See also State v. 
5 
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Brown, 607 P.2d 261,273 (Utah 1980) ("Even as to affirmative defenses, for which the 
defendant has the burden of producing proof, the burden of negating such defenses by proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt remains with the prosecution."); Utah Code Ann. § 76-l-502(2)(a) 
(prosecution "requirefd] [to] negat[e] a defense . . . [b]y proof. . . [if] , . . [t]he defense is an 
issue in the case as a result of evidence presented at trial, either by the prosecution or the 
defense."). According to Defendant, evidence will be presented at his trial demonstrating the 
existence of special mitigation. Therefore, consistent with due process and both Utah statutory 
and case law, because special mitigation is a defense to murder, it is the prosecution's burden to 
prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, the absence of special mitigation in order for the State to 
obtain a conviction. To the extent that the special mitigation statute requires otherwise, 
Defendant argues that the burden of proof requirement the statute imposes upon Defendant must 
be deemed unconstitutional and, therefore, unenforceable. On these grounds, Defendant requests 
the court tit instruct the juty that before he can be convicted of murder, the prosecution must 
prove the absence of special mitigation beyond a reasonable doubt. 
If the foregoing argument were sound, Defendant would be entitled to the relief he seeks.1 
However, the fundamental premise of his argument—that special mitigation is a defense to the 
charge of murder-is simply not true. Special mitigation is not a defense to a prosecution, 
affirmative or otherwise. Unlike a defense, such as insanity, self-defense, or compulsion, special 
mitigation has no bearing whatsoever upon a defendant's criminal culpability. Indeed, in any 
This is so notwithstanding the State's response to Defendant's arguments. Oddly, the State nowhere challenges 
Defendant's central premise, but also assumes that special mitigation is a defense to murder. Despite the State's 
arguments otherwise, if special mitigation is a defense, then there is no avoiding either the legislative mandate or the Utah 
Supreme Court holding that the State bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt the absence of defenses 
raised by a defendant in a criminal case. 
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criminal case, if the prosecution fails to prove the absence of a defense beyond a reasonable 
doubt, the outcome is an acquittal for the defendant, not, as the special mitigation statute 
requires, a guilty verdict on a reduced charge. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-205.5(5)(b). On the 
otlier hand, special mitigation does bear directly upon a defendant's moral culpability for a crime, 
which is relevant to the punishment a defendant should receive. The whole point of mitigation 
evidence generally, and special mitigation specifically, is to provide a justification for imposing a 
less-severe punishment upon a defendant for the crime he has committed. By allowing a 
reduction in the level of offense from murder to manslaughter, this is precisely what special 
mitigation evidence achieves. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-205.5(4)(b)(iii). 
More to the point, however, the special mitigation statute requires that in carder for special 
mitigation to exist, a defendant must cause the death of another while acting "under a delusion 
attributable to a mental illness." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-205.5(l)(a) (emphasis added). Pursuant 
to Section 76-2-305, it "is a defense to a prosecution . . , that the defendant, as a result of mental 
illness, lacked the mental state required as an element of the offense charged.... Mental illness 
is not otherwise a defense. . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-305(l)(b) (emphasis added). In light of 
this clear legislative mandate, special mitigation cannot be viewed as a defense to murder. 
Because Defendant's arguments are based entirely upon the false premise that special mitigation 
is a defense to murder, they fail to provide a legitimate foundation for the request he makes. 
Finally, and of equal concern to the Court, the Court will address the scope of the defense 
request. As noted above, Defendant, on April 30,2007, filed "Defendant's Specific Request for 
Instruction Regarding Burden of Proof and Supporting Memorandum." No proposed instruction 
was attached to the Motion or Supporting Memorandum. 
7 
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At the conclusion of his Memorandum in Support, Defendant requests that "this Court 
should not instruct the jury in compliance with § 76-5-205.5(4)(a) but should instruct the jury 
that the prosecutor must negate Defendant's argument that he is entitled to special mitigation 
unless the prosecution proves, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he is not entitled to special 
mitigation/' (Defendant's Memorandum in Support at p.8). Elsewhere, the defense argues that 
the jury must be instructed that, once the issue has been raised, the jury must find special 
mitigation in this case unless and until the State presents evidence that proves beyond a 
reasonable doubt that special mitigation is not justified. 
Notably, Defendant has not sought a declaratory judgment regarding the constitutionality 
of § 76-5-205.5(4)(a), and then a stay regardless of the decision. The breadth of Defendant's 
"request" is far more reaching. He has sought, in his request, a jury instruction at odds with 
statutory law. 
In order to grant the request of Defendant, the Court would necessarily have to proceed as 
follows: 
1. First, the Court would need to declare § 76-5-205.5(4)(a) unconstitutional. Trial 
courts are generally disinclined to declare statutes unconstitutional, and presume their 
constitutionality absent obvious facial defects. Here the Defendant, inferentially, demands a 
finding of unconstitutionality based upon state and federal due process concerns, coupled with a 
finding of misapplication of extra-legislative powers. Generally, a finding of unconstitutionality 
results in a stay, pending appellate review. But Defendant seeks no stay. With a finding of 
unconstitutionality, the special mitigation doctrine no longer can be applied in this case. The 
proposed Defense instruction of special mitigation involving the actor acting under a delusion 
8 
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attributable to a mental illness under state law would no longer apply because the very statute 
relied upon by Defendant has been found unconstitutional. That is a problem. 
The defendant risks the exclusion of the very special mitigation statute that he is relying 
upon in his notice; he may be arguing indirectly for the death/demise of the special mitigation 
doctrine unique to Utah. On the other hand, in all fairness to the Defense, the claim may be that 
the special mitigation statute is constitutional but for the burden of proof issues and the 
Defendant wishes to retain the benefit of special mitigation. But the burden of proof issues are 
so critical and central in the estimation of the Court, that their analysis and challenge would 
defeat the entire mitigation statutory scheme, 
2. Next, Defense requests that the Court find that special mitigation is tantamount to a 
defense. While portions of the Defense argument appeal to the Court's sense of humanity, how 
can this Court convert this recognized hybrid, unique to the State of Utah, from a special 
mitigation category to a defense? How can this Court designate special mitigation, as an 
affirmative defense or otherwise, and add recognized special mitigation such as delusional beliefs 
to the statutorily recognized defenses such as self defense and compulsion? 
3. Next, Defense requests that the Court modify the applicable statute by shifting the 
burden of proof from the Defendant to the State of Utah. 
4. Next, Defense requests that the Court then modify the applicable statute by enhancing 
the burden of proof from a "preponderance of the evidence" standard to a "beyond a reasonable 
doubt" standard. 
5. Next, the Court notes that the conversion of special mitigation as a legally recognized 
defense would require a modification and expansion of other Utah statutes dealing with mental 
9 
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illness. 
6. Next, the Defense requests that the Court prepare/authorize a jury instruction 
consistent with the Court's rewritten version of § 76-5-205.5(4)(a). 
The Court cannot rewrite the applicable statutes. It is one thing to declare a statute 
unconstitutional. It is quite another to request a total revision of applicable statutes and then to 
approve the drafting of a jury instruction anticipatorily consistent with that new, judicially 
revised statute. 
Were the Court to grant the request, it would dramatically ignore the separation of powers 
and would necessarily exercise judicial, legislative, and executive powers. This Court refuses to 
usurp those constitution powers. This judge, would become an activist judge assuming all 
powers, personally rewriting statutes, and substituting judgment and reason without deference to 
legislative, executive and appellate legitimate concerns and considerations. As a trial judge, the 
Court may consider the constitutionality of a statute. But, most often, the Court will defer to 
appellate courts on constitutional challenges. If this Court were to declare the statute 
unconstitutional and then declare remedial language, it assumes both an appellate judicial role 
and a legislative role. If this Court were to revise the entire statute and other statutes affected by 
those changes, it has assumed exclusive legislative authority. Should the Court then rely upon its 
Court order as new legislation by signing the order (signing the new statute into law), it has 
stepped into the executive domain by sanctioning, signing, and endorsing a newly created statute 
to be applied in the entire State of Utah. The Defense then requests that this judicially created 
and revised new law be applied in a first degree murder case. It is the opinion of this Court that, 
should this Court grant Defendant's request, it would be applying an illegal judicial fiat. The 
10 
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Court is simply without authority to do what the Defense requests. 
Of equal concern would be the delays that would result from this Court's disregard for 
constitutionally recognized separation of powers. Undoubtedly, revising the statute and crafting 
a jury instruction consistent with the exclusive judicial revision, would create a host of 
constitutional challenges, extensive delays, and a jurisprudential nightmare. The statutory 
distinction between special mitigation and defense would be potentially eviscerated, clouding the 
remedy of mitigation and acquittal Further, legislative intent would be abrasively and 
deplorably slighted. 
Order 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's Specific Request for Instruction Regarding 
Burden of Proof is denied. The Clerk of the Court is instructed to schedule further proceedings 
in this case. 
DATED this f & day of December, 2007. 
BY THE COURT: 
/ 
11 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF UTAH, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
ERYK DREJ, 
vs. 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant. 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
Case No. 051402396 
Judge Lynn W. Davis 
I certify that on the j fl day of December, 2007,1 mailed or hand-delivered a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Ruling on Defendant's Specific Request for Instruction Regarding 
Burden of Proof to counsel as follows: 
Thomas H. Means 
Anthony Howell 
Utah County Public Defender Association 
Attorneys for Defendant 
51 South University Avenue, Suite 206 
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Jeffrey R. Buhman 
Chad E. Grunander 
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100 East Center Street, Suite 2100 
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Senate Floor Debate 
SB20 Special Mitigation for Mentally 111 Offenders 
January 22, 1999 
President: The next bill before us is Senate Bill 20. 
Clerk: S.B. 20 Special Mitigation for Mentally 111 Offenders by Senator 
Juiander 
President: Senator Juiander 
Senator Juiander: Senate, uh, Bill 20 was brought to us by the Attorney General's 
Office, This legislation allows the severely mentally ill offenders 
who are delusional and believe they are acting in self-defense to 
mitigate the level of their offense down one degree. As can non-
mentally ill defenders, offenders, that reasonally, but mistakenly 
believe-that they are acting with legal justification. This change 
goes a long way towards addressing the Utah Supreme Court's 
fairness concerns. Prosecutors support the bill because it only 
applies to the severely mentally ill defenders, only reduces the 
offense one degree and has procedural safe guards prevent it, to 
prevent it from being misused. That is once the state has proven 
all elements of murder beyond a reasonable doubt, the offense 
would only be mitigated if the jury finds by a preponderance of the 
evidence, that the defendant was mentally ill and acted under a 
delusion which if the facts existed as he believed them to be would 
have justified his acting in self-defense. Senate Bill 20 is needed 
because Utah's insanity defense statutes are among the strictest in 
our nation. Because they are so strict they've been challenged as 
being unfair. Particularly to the severely mentally ill who would be 
found not guilty by reason of insanity in most other states. While 
the Supreme Court upheld an insanity defense statute in State v. 
Herrera, it was a narrow 3 to, 3 to 2 decision in which even the 
majority had concerns about the fairness of our present law. For 
example a severely mentally ill person who killed another under 
the delusion that he is acting in self-defense is simply guilty of 
murder. He does not have the level of his defense mitigated one 
degree such as from man, murder to manslaughter as do those who 
are not delusional but mistakenly believe they are legally justified. 
Referred to as imperfect self-defense. It would seem fair that the 
very small amount of mentally ill offenders who commit murder 
while under a delusion that they are acting in self-defense be 
treated similarly to those others who reasonally but erroneously 
believe that they are legally justified, I will, uh, that is the end of 
my debate and I will, uh, answer any questions. 
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President: Senator Poulton 
Senator Poulton: Umm31 do drugs or something for two or three years, four or five 
years, whatever, I lose my mental capacities I become delusional, 
umm, and I go around killing people, am I totally insane? Am I 
delusionally insane? 
Senator Julander: Drugs and alcohol are excluded from this legislation. 
Senator Poulton: So, if I am under the influence of alcohol and I, I am delusional 
and I commit murder it is still murder? 
Senator Julander: Yes. 
Senator Poulton: It could be or it is? 
Senator Hillyard: I don't know 
Senator Julander: It is. 
Senator Hillyard: If I could speak in the microphone. You have given a very narrow 
thing that could have all sorts of ramifications. It's not that simple 
and I mean you could say yes 
Senator Poulton: I want it to be that simple. 
Senator Hillyard: Well, I wish you could and dealing with human beings I wish I 
could it make it one simple category and that deals with everybody 
and we've got it all done. You can't make it, what do you mean by 
delusional, Senator? 
Senator Poulton: Oh, Pm not arguing with you, Senator. I understand what you're 
saying and I agree with you. 
Senator Hillyard: You're using a term that has different meanings. 
Senator Poulton: I know what you're saying and I am not disagreeing. So, we have 
someone who is drunk, commits murder, they could still be 
prosecuted for murder, they wouldn't have an insanity plea based 
on this statute. 
Senator Hillyard: Not on voluntary intoxification they would and even if they were 
out of their mind with drinking the alcohol 
(inaudible) 
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families with disabilities that are here in the rotunda and we want 
to make sure that we can do that. Umm, could we, uh5 just come 
back to this as unfinished business if we can on Monday? 
Senator Julander: That is all right with me, but may I correct a gross mistake that I 
have made with my first bill on the Senate first? 
President: You bet. 
Senator Julander; Umrn, I did not move the amendments that were made in the, uh, 
committee. They are found on this sheet and I'm not sure how I 
am supposed to do that. 
President: If they were made in committee then they are already a part. 
Senator Julander: They are already in there? Thank you, Mr. President. 
President: Thank you. Senator Hillyard. 
Senator Hillyard: Let me explain to, to maybe the new members who may not know. 
When it's a matter of unfinished business and when we start 
Monday we will start with this bill. If we circled it, then we would 
start on the 3rd reading calendar and come back and work down the 
2nd reading calendar, so by doing, leaving as unfinished business, 
uh, Senator Julander, you'll be the first agenda item. 
Senator Julander: Thank you. 
Senator Hillyard: Monday morning. 
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Senate Floor Debate 
SB20 Special Mitigation for Mentally 111 Offenders 
January 25, 1999 
President: 
Senator Julander: 
President: 
Senator Julander: 
President: 
Senator Julander:. 
President: 
Senator Julander: 
President: 
Senator Julander: 
President: 
Senator Julander: 
President: 
Senator Spencer: 
President: 
Senator Julander: 
Senator Julander, we have unfinished business, Senate Bill 20 
Thank you, Mr. President. Before we proceed on this bill, uh, 
there was some confusion as to whether the amendment was made 
and I would like to move the amendment this morning, umm, that 
was made in the committee, page 5. 
Senator Julander, the bill, if it was made in committee, it should 
already be on the bill, was it made? It was adopted with the 
committee report. 
Legislative research tells me there is some confusion that it was 
not indeed made. 
Well. 
It was made but not recorded is what I am being told. 
It was not reported? . 
Recorded. 
In the commit, we have it here. So, it had to be recorded 
somewhere. Is it on page 5 lines 123? 
Yes, Mr. President. 
Uh, we have a signed copy from Senator Terry Spencer, 
Committee Chair that indicates that it was adopted in committee. 
Thank you very much. 
Senator Spencer, are you, do you have any recollection of this? 
I believe it was adopted. 
We show that it was adopted, so. Thank you. 
Thank you very much. 
President: Now to the bill 
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prosecutors from other states asking about Utah's standard. Before 
1983 Utah followed the majority position that somebody who was 
mentally ill and because of that couldn't appreciate the 
wrongfulness of what they did could be found not guilty by reason 
of insanity and after the attempted assassination of President 
Ronald Reagan and the verdict in the Hinckley case, Utah and 
other states studied it's insanity defense statute and what we came 
up with was a very, very strict standard. And that is that if 
somebody intends to kill, we're not interested in hearing about, uh, 
mental, uh, defense excuses. Umm, if they, in fact are so mentally 
ill that they do not realize that they are killing somebody or that 
they do not intend to kill, then and only then they may have the 
benefit of Utah's very strict standard. But predictably, uh, defense 
attorneys challenge Utah's statute as being unduly harsh, because it 
is so out of keeping with the rest of the nation and said that the, 
this was not constitutional and in a 3 to 2 decision the Utah . 
Supreme Court has upheld, narrowly upheld Utah's insanity 
defense statute. In doing that though, it is clear that even the 
majority had some concerns about the fairness of our statute.. And 
one of the reasons that we put together this committee was that we 
saw the Herrera case as not just a, a victory for prosecutors, but as 
a wake up call to determine whether we could improve upon. 
Utah's insanity defense statute. And what we came up with and 
have proposed now is this concept of special mitigation for those 
mentally ill individuals that are so extremely mentally ill and 
delusional that they in fact think that they are defending their own 
lives or that they are otherwise legally justified and we made this 
as about as narrow an exception could be made for example right 
now will all the publicity about the Triad case, is this a case, is this 
statute one that could be used in that instance? Well, I would say 
no, umm, we were very careful to make sure that person's delusion 
would have to be such that they actually believe that they are 
defending their lives or for example that they were a soldier 
fighting a war and they are killing an enemy soldier. Umm, in 
most other states all but a couple other states anybody who 
qualified under this definition would be found not guilty by reason 
of insanity. We took a much more measured approach in this bill. 
First of all we, we require that it would only reduce the level of 
offense one degree from the offense the person was otherwise 
charged with and would be convicted of So, for example if they 
were charged with murder and they intentionally killed another the 
most benefit that they could get would be a one-degree reduction 
to manslaughter. Secondly we put the burden on the defense to 
establish by a preponderance of the evidence that in fact the 
defendant was mentally ill and had a delusion at the time of the act 
which if those facts existed that the person believed existed would 
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Senator: 
Creighton Horton: 
Senator: 
Right. So, that in the process of trial when a criminal defendant 
deter, uh, petitions the court through their attorney that they are 
mentally incompetent this doesn't affect that process. 
No. Mental competence to stand trial is a separate issue and this in 
no way impacts that. 
And after judgment in the appeals process if a, if a claimant, uh, 
petitioned again the court that person was, that defendant was 
mentally incompetent by reasons of some form of insanity that 
would not affect the appeals process. 
Creighton Horton: That' s right. 
Senator: 
Creighton Horton: 
Senator: 
Senator Julander: 
(inaudible) 
Senator: 
Creighton Horton: 
Senator: 
Creighton Horton: 
So, this a very limited scope and reparable only to those cases in 
which the defendant at the time of the offense believed he was 
delusionally believes that he was defending, defending himself. 
That's right. 
Thank you. 
Any further questions? 
Thank you, Mr. President. So, in a case where a defendant is 
shown to be mentally ill at the time of the offense would the 
verdict be then innocent because mentally ill or would it be, could 
they be found guilty but mental illness was involved and therefore 
the sentencing should take that into consideration? 
They're found guilty of one degree less serious crime they are not 
found not guilty or not guilty by reason of insanity. They are 
found guilty of the lesser offense but again it is not all mentally ill 
and it's not even all delusional mentally ill, it's only those who are 
delusional and mentally ill and the delusion relates directly to 
defending themselves. So, it's a very, it's about as narrow as you 
can have any classification. 
Could, could you explain again the, uh, the degrees that 
Yes, umm, if somebody for example is charged with murder a 
crime of killing that is one degree less than that in terms of murder 
is a first degree felony, five to life, the next degree down is a 
second degree felony for manslaughter. Right now for anybody 
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degree. Because not all mental defenses are illegitimate in my 
experience most of them are but they're maybe some that are 
legitimate and again it's not just that they are mentally ill and it's 
not just that they are delusional they have to think that they are 
defending their lives and that's pretty hard for them to show 
because they use the other facts like in the Triad case but if a 
woman comes in and says that she wants to talk to somebody and 
she's got guns and claims that people have been stalking her well 
none of that serves as a basis if that is her delusion of going in with 
weapons and shooting somebody. So, that would not come within 
the ambit of this statute. 
Senator: There is some concern in the community that we should also 
extend, remove of the death penalty to people who are mentally 
retarded and in that situation, someone so mentally severely 
retarded that they didn't understand what they were doing we 
should not put that person through the death penalty for that, but in 
that situation it is very difficult to fain medical re. medica, mental 
retardation because it is very testable, there are a lot of parameters 
that can be used to determine an actuality of whether the person is 
mentally retarded or not, but that's not the case in terms of mental 
illness in mental illness there is a lot more opportunity a lot more 
leeway in, uh, in manipulating and suggesting they have mental 
illness when in fact they don't, umm, I'm concerned again that a 
defendant might claim paranoia and it would be difficult to prove 
because of the inexact nature of the diagnosis of mental illness. 
Creighton Horton: And that's exactly why we insisted that the burden be on them to 
establish it to the satisfaction of the judge or j ury rather than the 
prosecution having to disprove beyond a reasonable doubt, which 
is what the defense bar wanted and we wouldn't agree to that. 
Senator: I want to understand perhaps more clearly what are the main 
reasons or purposes for drafting this bill was to defend our already 
strict statute on the mental illness defense, is that right? 
Creighton Horton: That's true. 
Senator: Thank you. 
Senator Julander: I move that we resolve ourselves as a committee as a whole, Mr. 
President. I think that there are, have been a few people who 
would like to speak for the bill if you would allow that Mr. 
President. 
(inaudible) 
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Senator Bev Evans: Aye 
Clerk: Mont Evans 
Senator: Mont Evans: Aye, I would like declare a conflict with this bill 
Clerk: Hale 
Senator Hale: 
Clerk; 
Senator Hellewell; 
Clerk: 
Senator Hillyard: 
Clerk: • 
Senator Howell: 
Clerk: 
Senator Hull: 
Clerk: 
Senator Jones: 
Clerk: 
Senator Mander: 
Clerk: 
Senator Knudson: 
Clerk: 
Senator Mansell: 
Clerk: 
Senator Mayne: 
Aye 
Hellewell 
Aye 
Hillyard 
Aye 
Howell 
Aye 
Hull 
Aye 
Jones 
Aye 
Julander 
Aye 
Knudson 
Aye 
Mansell 
Aye 
Mayne 
Aye 
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President; Aye on 2. Senate Bill 20 has 29 Aye votes which is unanimous 
and will be passed to the 3rd reading calendar. We will now go to 
the 3rd 
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Senate Floor Debate 
SB20 Special Mitigation for Mentally 111 Offenders 
January 26, 1999 
President: 
Clerk: 
President: 
Senator Julander: 
President: 
Senator Julander: 
President: 
Clerk: 
That concludes the business that we have, are there any other 
announcements? Seeing none we will go to the 3rd reading calendar 
and we'll begin with Senate Bill 20. 
Senate Bill 20 Special Mitigation for Mentally III Offenders by 
Senator Julander, 
Senator Julander; 
Thank you, Mr. President- Senate Bill 20 Special Mitigation for 
the Mentally 111 Offenders was very thoroughly discussed 
yesterday on the Senate floor, uh, I would like to just remind you 
that the Statewide Association of Prosecutors, the Law 
Enforcement Legislative Committee, the Utah Sentencing 
Commission, and the Utah Council on Victims, and the 
Commission on Criminal Juvenile Justice all endorse and support 
this bill and I call for the question. 
Are there any other questions of Senator Julander? 
I Call for the question, Mr. President on Senate Bill 20. 
Question is shall Senate Bill 20 pass. Roll Call vote. 
Senator Ed Allen 
Senator Ed Allen: 
Clerk: 
Senator Ron Allen: 
Clerk: 
Senator Blackham: 
Clerk: 
Senator Davis: 
Aye 
Ron Allen 
Aye 
Blackham 
Aye 
Davis 
Aye 
Clerk: Dmitrich 
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Clerk: Montgomery 
Senator Montgomery: Aye 
Clerk: Muhlestein 
Clerk: 
Clerk: 
Senator Peterson: 
Clerk: 
Senator Poulton: 
Clerk: 
Clerk: 
Nielson 
Petersor 
Aye 
Poulton 
Aye 
Spencer 
Steele 
Senator Steele: Aye 
Clerk: Stephenson 
Senator Stephenson: Aye 
Clerk: Suazo 
Senator Sauzo: Aye 
Clerk: Valentine 
Senator Valentine: Aye (inaudible) 
Clerk: Waddoups 
Senator Waddoups: Aye 
Clerk: Senator Nielson. Senator Nielson 
Senator Nielson: Senator Nielson, Aye 
Clerk: President Beattie 
President: Aye 
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House Floor Debate 
SB20 Special Mitigation for Mentally 111 Offenders 
February^ 1999 
Chair: 
Reading Clerk: 
Chair: 
Madam reading clerk. 
Senate Bill 20 Special Mitigation for Mentally 111 Offenders, Paula 
F. Julander. Judiciary vote, six yes, zero no, and five absence. 
Representative Cox. 
Representative Cox: Thank, Mr. Chair. Before you stait worrying that this is a defense 
related bill I need you to understand that this bill originated within 
the Statewide Association of Prosecutors and it is, it is promoted 
by the Prosecution Council This is an unusual bill. Like I say, 
well it looks like it comes from the defense community or the 
mental health community, actually was framed entirely by 
prosecutors. In 1983, following the attempt on President Reagan's 
life, Utah broke with the majority of states and passed a law . 
abolishing the traditional insanity defense, Utah law used to 
, provide that a defendant was not guilty by reason of insanity if as a 
result of mental illness he lacked substantial capacity to appreciate 
the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the 
requirements of the law. The 1983 law that we passed provides 
that mental illness is only a defense if the defendant as a result of 
mental illness lacked the mental state required as an element of the 
offense. For example the mental state for murder is intentionally 
or knowingly causing the death of another. Thus under Utah law 
and our strict mental illness defense, if a mentally ill person 
intends to kill or knows he's killing he's guilty of murder even if 
the killing is a product of mental illness and the defendant was 
unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct. If the 
defendant intends to kill, mental defense does not apply. One must 
be so mentally ill that he does not even realize that he is killing. 
The example that the Supreme Court gives is if someone who 
thinks that they are squeezing a grapefruit rather than strangling a 
person. In the State v. Herrera the Supreme Court here in our state 
in a 3 to 2 decision, narrow decision upheld the constitutionality of 
our law. 
Chair: Representative Cox. 
Representative Cox: Yes 
Chair: Representative, there is a lot of buzzing going around today, it is 
difficult to hear. If you have conversations if you could keep them 
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Committee, and the Commission on Criminal and Juvenile Justice. 
With that I am open for questions. 
Chair: Thank you, Representative Cox. Representative Tyler. 
Representative Tyler: Thank you, Mr. Speaker. Personal privilege requested. 
Speaker: Personal privilege Granted, Representative Bigelow. 
Representative Bigelow: Thank you, Mr. Speaker. Would the sponsor yield to a question? 
Chair: Representative Cox, will you yield? 
(inaudible) 
Representative Bigelow: Thank you, Mr. Speaker. On section 4 and I guess this would be 
on about, uh, there's a discussion about special mitigation being 
considered and if there is unanimous consent that this applies a 
lower conviction is resulted or that they automatically go to a 
lower conviction rate if they unanimously agree that they do not 
apply the special circumstances then the higher conviction or 
degree of offense is supported. But it says that if it's not 
unanimous for special mitigation one way or the other the result is 
a hung jury, does that mean then that the whole trial is suspended 
because they were not unanimous in the special mitigation? What 
does that really mean by hung jury? 
That is, that is correct. It means that they would have to try that 
again. Mr. Chair if I could ask of leave of the chair. Mr. 
Creighton Horton from the Attorney General's Office, excuse me, 
Mr. Speaker, is here and helped draft this bill, if I could have him 
come and stand by me and help me out. 
That would be fine. 
Thank you. Thank you, that is correct that it, a hung jury means 
that the case would need to be tried again. It is not unusual in 
these cases either. 
Thank you, Mr. Bigelow. Representative Pace. 
Mr. Speaker would the sponsor yield to a question. 
Representative Cox will you yield? 
Representative Cox: 
Speaker: 
Representative Cox: 
Speaker: 
Representative Pace: 
Speaker: 
Representative Cox: Certainly. 
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Representative Cox: Generally a schizophrenia in those situations as I am advised by 
counsel but that's going to be determined in court. 
Representative Rowan: Well, Pm just wondering whether it would be better to define that 
mental illness as more of what we mean rather than what we think. 
So, all right, thank you. 
Speaker: Further discussion. Seeing none. Representative Cox for 
summation. 
Representative Cox: Thank you. I appreciate those questions the definition that is there 
in this bill is the same definition that we use in the strictest 
standard in the nation and the statute that we have in the books 
currently. This is, it is important, it's an issue of fairness, it also an 
issue of being able to hopefully provide some protection for the 
standard that we currently have. We would like to maintain our 
situation in this state where individuals who commit these kinds of 
crimes while delusional while mentally ill are still found guilty but 
insane rather than not guilty by reason of insanity. And with that I 
will submit it, thank you. I encourage your support. 
Speaker: Thank you, voting is open on Senate Bill 20. Seeing all present 
having voted, voting will be closed. Senate Bill 20 having 
received 47 yes votes and 21 no votes passes this body. The 
forgoing Senate Bill 20 was public read by title (inaudible) signed 
by the Speaker of the House in the presence of the House by which 
he presides and in fact such signing duly entered upon the journal 
on the date of February the 4th 1999. 
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